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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
JUAN QUITERIO PEREZ : Case No. 20000517-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code Annotated 
section 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996), which authorizes this Court to review appeals that the Utah 
Supreme Court transfers to this Court. 
ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION 
1. Because the crime of attempted murder based on a depraved indifference to 
human life does not exist in Utah, reversal is required when the trial court instructs the 
jury on that theory for attempted murder. The trial judge instructed the jury on several 
theories for attempted murder including conduct showing a depraved indifference to 
human life. Did the trial judge err? 
Whether a person can be convicted of attempted depraved indifference murder is a 
question of law which this Court reviews for correctness. State v. Vigil 842 P.2d 843, 
844 (Utah 1992). Defense counsel requested the trial judge not to instruct the jury on 
attempted depraved indifference murder. R. 360: 281.l In any event, convicting a person 
of a nonexistent crime constitutes a manifest injustice which this Court may review 
initially on appeal. State v. Haston, 846 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1993). 
2A. The trial court must continue a criminal trial when the State fails to notify the 
defendant 30 days before trial of an intent to admit expert testimony and the lack of notice 
prevents the defendant from adequately preparing for trial. The State notified Appellant 
Juan Quiterio Perez of critical evidence linking him to the crime during the State's 
expert's testimony in the middle of trial. Did the trial judge abuse his discretion in failing 
to continue the trial? 
This Court applies an abuse of discretion standard to the trial court's failure to 
continue a trial when the State neglects to notify the defendant of expert testimony. State 
v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Defense counsel objected to the 
admission of this evidence. R. 359: 155-56. Further, under Utah Code Annotated section 
77-17-13(3) (1999), a continuance is mandatory when the lack of notice prejudices the 
defense. In any event, the trial judge's failure to order a continuance was plain error. 
]The volumes marked 359 and 360 contain the trial transcript. The volume marked 
357 contains the preliminary hearing transcript. The volume marked 361 contains the 
sentencing hearing transcript. The internal page numbers of those volumes are listed after 
the volume number. 
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2B. When a criminal defendant requests the State to disclose inculpatory 
evidence, the State has a continuing duty to release the evidence. Although Mr. Perez 
repeatedly requested the State's fingerprint evidence, the State failed to disclose it until 
the middle of trial. Did the trial judge abuse his discretion in refusing to exclude the 
fingerprint evidence when the State's omission deprived Mr. Perez an opportunity to 
rebut the evidence. 
Appellate courts review the failure to exclude evidence that the State unfairly 
failed to disclose for an abuse of discretion. State v. Knight 734 P.2d 913, 918-19 (Utah 
1987). Defense counsel specifically requested the trial judge to exclude the expert 
testimony. R. 359: 155-56. 
3. Although trial judges may explain or clarify the evidence, they may not indicate 
a preference for either party. The trial judge repeatedly disrupted defense counsel's 
examination without the prosecutor objecting, bolstered the credibility of the State's 
witnesses, prevented Mr. Perez from presenting his defense, commented on Mr. Perez's 
right to silence, and shifted the burden of proof to the defense. Did the trial judge's 
conduct deprive Mr. Perez of a fair trial? 
Whether the trial judge's comments deprived a defendant of a fair trial appears to 
be a question of law. State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 980 (Utah 1998). Defense counsel 
did not challenge the fairness of the trial. But, given the trial judge's hostility toward Mr. 
Perez, doing so would have exposed Mr. Perez to further hostile conduct. In any event, 
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the trial judge plainly erred in depriving Mr. Perez of a fair trial. 
4. The trial court abuses its discretion if it imposes consecutive sentences without 
considering all relevant sentencing factors including the gravity and circumstances of the 
offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. In 
imposing consecutive sentences, the trial judge focused exclusively on the circumstances 
of the offenses, minimized favorable sentencing factors, and stated that without 
consecutive sentences Mr. Perez's "ultimate appeal wouldn't have near the poignancy." 
Did the trial judge abuse his discretion in imposing consecutive sentences? 
This Court reviews sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Montoya, 929 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Defense counsel opposed the 
imposition of consecutive sentencing at the sentencing hearing. R. 361: 9. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND COURT RULES 
The Addenda contains the following statutes and court rule: 
Addendum B: Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (1999) 
Addendum C: Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a), (b) 
Addendum D: Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1) (1999) 
Addendum E: Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1), (2) (1999) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 30, 1999, the State filed an Information charging Mr. Perez with 
aggravated burglary and attempted murder. R. 2. The trial court conducted a preliminary 
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hearing on the charges on December 14, 1999. R. 357. Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
conducted a jury trial on April 18 and 19, 2000. R. 359; 360. The jury convicted Mr. 
Perez of both charges. R. 320; 321. On May 26, 2000, Judge Frederick sentenced Mr. 
Perez to terms of five years to life for aggravated burglary and one to 15 years for 
attempted murder. R. 361: 8-9; 332. Judge Frederick ordered the terms to run 
consecutively. R. 361: 8-10. Mr. Perez filed a timely notice of appeal on June 8, 2000. 
R. 334. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Factual Background 
On April 28, 1999, Ellen Kuhel and her adult son Robert moved into a basement 
apartment located in a four-plex apartment building in Midvale. R. 43-46. Ms. Kuhel 
was 65 years old and she suffered from numerous chronic illnesses including diabetes and 
a damaged spine. Exhibit 22; R. 359: 64. Although no specific records exist on the 
occupancy of the apartment, the apartments in the same building typically remained 
vacant one to two months between tenants. R. 360: 270. 
The apartment building was located in a high-crime, lower-income area where 
many Hispanic people resided. R. 359: 107. On the street outside the building, a group 
of Hispanic men had parked a truck and camper where they drank alcohol, smoked 
marijuana, and engaged in sexual relations with females. R. 359: 50, 61-62, 73-74, 102. 
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The camper was parked 15 feet outside Ms. Kuhel's bedroom window. R. 359: 118. The 
marijuana smoke particularly bothered Ms. Kuhel because it caused her to have migraine 
headaches. R. 359:50-51. 
According to emergency personnel reports, on August 9, 1999, at about 12:30 
a.m., Ms. Kuhel was sleeping in her bed when she awoke to find a person on top of and 
hitting her. R. 359: 100; Exhibit 22. She stated to an emergency medical technician that 
she thought the assailant had used a knife. Exhibit 22. After struggling with the assailant 
for several minutes, Ms. Kuhel kicked the assailant as hard as she could in the pelvic area. 
R. 359: 53-55. Ms. Kuhel concluded that the assailant was a man because she felt male 
genitals when the kick landed. R. 359: 54-55. 
The assailant fled the bedroom as Ms. Kuhel followed chase. R. 359: 54-55. The 
man could not exit through the front door because Ms. Kuhel's son Robert had installed a 
dead bolt lock that required a key to unlock from the inside. R. 357: 16. Ms. Kuhel 
looked for her cane to use as a weapon but the assailant fled through the kitchen window 
and escaped. R. 359: 58-59, 98, 100. Ms. Kuhel immediately awoke Robert who was 
sleeping in another bedroom and contacted the police. R. 359: 59. 
Officer Brian Holdaway arrived at the scene and found Ms. Kuhel bleeding from 
the head. R. 359: 97. Ms. Kuhel informed Officer Holdaway that she awoke to find a 
man on top of and assaulting her. R. 359: 100. Although she could not identify the man, 
she thought he looked "dark" and that he wore a stocking cap. R. 359: 59. She 
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speculated that the assailant was Hispanic because she had experienced some unspecified 
problems with Hispanic people before and the man "smelled" Hispanic. R. 359: 101-02. 
Emergency medical personnel transported Ms. Kuhel to the hospital where a 
doctor sutured a one-centimeter laceration on Ms. Kuhel5s scalp and a three-centimeter 
laceration under her eye. R. 359: 97, 191-92. Ms. Kuhel also incurred abrasions on her 
shoulder, breast, arms, and hands. R. 359: 192. 
Robert informed Officer Holdaway that his mother had informed him of a 
confrontation she had experienced with the men using the camper. R. 359: 102. Robert 
reported that the men were partying loudly with some girls when Ms. Kuhel walked out to 
the camper and told them to quiet down. R. 359: 102. Neither Robert nor Ms. Kuhel 
reported any other problems with Hispanic people. R. 359: 103. Despite this 
confrontation with the men in the camper, the police made no attempt to contact anyone 
in the camper or to interview any neighbors in the neighborhood about the men. R. 359: 
105; 360:245-46. 
Officer Greg Wathan managed the crime scene investigation. R. 359: 116. Officer 
Wathan first looked for prints on the kitchen counter and the containers on it. R. 359: 
122-23. Although he found numerous fingerprints piled on top of each other on the 
counter none were discernible. R. 359: 137-38. 
Officer Wathan found several prints on the window sill but only one was clearly 
identifiable. R. 359: 123, 147. That print was formed with a right hand and was pointed 
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in a direction consistent with someone entering the apartment through the window from 
outside. R. 359: 129, 144-47; 360: 301-03; Exhibits 11, 20. Officer Wathan found other 
prints on the window. Exhibit 1. One of them was clearly visible with the naked eye and 
was formed with a left hand by someone outside the window who had slid open the 
window. R. 359: 126, 128. Although Officer Wathan visually inspected the apartment, 
he gathered no other evidence. R. 359: 158-62. He relied, instead, solely on the 
fingerprint evidence. 
Officer Lynn Burgon conducted a computer analysis of the prints that Officer 
Wathan found on the window sill and the window. R. 359: 203-04. Both prints matched 
Mr. Perez. R. 359: 203-07. 
One month after the attack, the case manager for the crime, Detective Jason 
Norton, showed Ms. Kuhel an array of six photographs which included a picture of Mr. 
Perez. R. 357: 53; 360: 247-48. As the photograph of Mr. Perez indicates, he has a 
prominent birthmark on his forehead. R. 360: 248; Exhibit 18. Ms. Kuhel informed 
Detective Norton that any of the photographs could have been the assailant. R. 360: 249. 
But, according to Detective Norton, Ms. Kuhel "didn't recognize anybody in there as 
anybody that she had ever seen before[.]ft R. 360: 249. Although some of the men in the 
photo array looked familiar to Ms. Kuhel, Detective Norton testified that Ms. Kuhel could 
not identify anyone "at all." R. 357: 47, 54. 
The police arrested Mr. Perez following the photo array. Detective Norton 
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interrogated Mr. Perez on October 5, 1999. R. 360: 220-21. Because Mr. Perez did not 
speak English and his residency status was apparently in question, two INS agents helped 
to interview Mr. Perez and interpret for Detective Norton. R. 359: 165, 177; 360: 223, 
227. After providing an INS agent biographical data, Mr. Perez waived his Miranda 
rights and agreed to speak with Detective Norton. R. 359: 168, 174-75, 181. 
Mr. Perez informed Detective Norton that he used to live in the apartment above 
Ms. Kuhel. Exhibit 3 at 3; see Addendum F. Although he knew of Ms. Kuhel and her 
son, he had no associations with them. R. 360: 242. He further denied associating with 
the men who used the camper. Exhibit 3 at 3. Mr. Perez stated that those men sold drugs 
but he had a job and otherwise stayed inside his apartment. Id. 
According to Detective Norton, Mr. Perez admitted to entering the apartment "a 
month or so1' before the interview to engage in a sexual encounter with a prostitute. R. 
360: 228-29. The attack on Ms. Kuhel occurred in August, two months before the 
interrogation. Mr. Perez stated that he entered through the kitchen window and then 
opened the front door for the prostitute. R. 360: 228. He maintained that when he 
entered the apartment it was vacant and there was no dead bolt lock on the front door. R. 
360: 229, 237. 
Detective Norton refused to accept Mr. Perez's denials and repeatedly accused him 
of lying. Exhibit 3 at 5-6, 10, 17, 19. He asserted further that Mr. Perez was lying about 
his ability to understand English. Id. at 17-19. But, when Detective Norton directly 
9 
asked Mr. Perez in English why he had entered the apartment, Mr. Perez replied, f,No 
entiendo mucho. Poquito," which means in English, "I don't understand a lot. A little." 
Id. at 18. When Detective Norton later asked if he understood English, Mr. Perez replied, 
"Poquito," meaning "A little." Id at 19. 
To entice Mr. Perez to confess, Detective Norton confronted Mr. Perez with the 
dead bolt lock, threatened to deport or incarcerate him, and represented that the district 
attorney may be lenient if he confessed. Id. at 5-6, 14, 23-26. He also falsely alleged that 
the assailant had taken money from Ms. Kuhel. Id. at 21-22. Despite all of these tactics, 
Mr. Perez consistently maintained his innocence. 
Discovery Requests 
The State charged Mr. Perez with aggravated burglary and attempted murder. R. 
2. Defense counsel entered an appearance on October 12, 1999. R. 9. That same day, 
defense counsel formally requested discovery under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. 
R. 10. Defense counsel demanded "[a]ny inculpatory evidence." R. 10. He also 
requested all potential witnesses' names, addresses, and telephone numbers and any 
"reports or results of scientific tests" or "police or investigative reports." R. 10-11. 
On October 20, 1999, defense counsel filed a second request for discovery. R. 19. 
Counsel specifically requested "[a]ll reports, documents and other information related to 
any fingerprint evidence and analysis conducted . . . . " R. 19. The State replied to this 
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request on November 1, 1999, claiming that it possessed none of the requested 
information. R. 21. But, the State assured the trial court that it would "strictly comply 
with the mandates of Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure." R. 21. 
On November 8, 1999, defense counsel filed a motion to compel the State to 
provide discovery. R. 23. Defense counsel argued that the materials which the State had 
supplied the defense referred to other information within the control of the district 
attorney or the police. R. 23. The trial court did not appear to resolve the motion. 
On March 24, 2000, defense counsel filed a notice that he may call an expert on 
fingerprint analysis. R. 155. In the notice, defense counsel stated that he could not 
specify the substance of the expert's testimony "[sjince defendant has not yet received 
full discovery or an expert witness notice from the State on this subject[.]" R. 155. On 
March 30, 2000, two weeks before trial, the State filed a notice of an intent to call 
Detective Burgon as an expert witness. R. 159. 
The Trial 
At the trial, the prosecutor conceded during opening remarks that although the 
State "clearly d[id]n't have an identification" of who attacked Ms. Kuhel, the State could 
link Mr. Perez to the crime. R. 359: 36-38. Defense counsel agreed that Ms. Kuhel 
"really doesn't have any idea who" attacked her. R. 359: 40. He noted that although the 
police correctly located Mr. Perez's prints in the apartment, he asserted that the State 
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could not connect the fingerprints to the crime because "the fingerprint witnesses in this 
case will tell you that fingerprints can last a long time." R. 359: 41-42. 
Ms. Kuhel related the details of the assault for the jury. R. 359: 43. During her 
testimony, however, she made numerous representations which she had never revealed 
before. She stated that when she moved into the apartment she thoroughly cleaned the 
residence including the windows, inside and out, and the kitchen counter tops. R. 359: 
45. She claimed further that because the neighbors muddied the kitchen window when 
they washed their cars, she regularly cleaned it. R. 359: 47. Ms. Kuhel stated that she 
needed clean windows because she suffered from claustrophobia. R. 359: 45-47. 
Ms. Kuhel further revealed for the first time that in late May, after moving into the 
apartment, Mr. Perez was sitting outside her bedroom window smoking marijuana. R. 
359: 49-51. She testified that she asked Mr. Perez not to smoke near her window, but, he 
responded in English, "You're dead meat." R. 359: 50-51, 78. Ms. Kuhel claimed that 
following this incident she would often pass by Mr. Perez on her way to the bus as he 
fixed his car. R. 359: 51. Each time she walked by Mr. Perez, he allegedly said in 
English, "You're dead meat." R. 359: 51, 78. These confrontations occurred at least six 
to eight times. R. 359: 79. Ms. Kuhel also noted that she saw Mr. Perez working on his 
car almost daily. R. 359: 79-80. 
Ms. Kuhel also introduced at trial that Mr. Perez was with the group near the 
camper that she yelled at a week before the attack. R. 359: 62-63. After yelling at the 
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group twice from her bedroom, she opened her curtains and saw Mr. Perez tossing small 
rocks toward her. R. 359: 62-63, 76. Mr. Perez then purportedly repeated his threat that 
she was "dead meat." R. 359: 63. 
As further additional details, Ms. Kuhel asserted that on the night of the attack she 
was lying awake in her bed when she heard someone outside her window say "that they 
was going to stab me." R. 359: 47, 68, 70. She claimed that the voice sounded like Mr. 
Perez's. R. 359: 52. After the assailant entered, Ms. Kuhel represented that she tried to 
fool the intruder into believing her son was awake by asking aloud, "What are you doing 
in my bedroom, Robert?" R. 359: 52. Then, during the assault, Ms. Kuhel claimed to 
have prayed aloud, "Help me. Jehovah, help me." R. 359: 54-55. In addition to claiming 
that the assailant tried to open the front door, Ms. Kuhel asserted that the assailant 
grabbed a chair to climb onto the kitchen counter by placing his hands on the counter. R. 
359: 57-59, 89-90. 
On cross-examination, Ms. Kuhel erroneously claimed that she had told the police 
about these additional details. R. 359: 66, 77-78, 88. She also contradicted her reports to 
the police and medical personnel that she was asleep when the assailant entered her 
bedroom. R. 359: 68-70. When asked why she had never previously revealed her 
numerous confrontations with Mr. Perez she stated that she was afraid she could not 
"prove" her allegations. R. 359: 71. As justification for failing to tell the police about her 
statements during the attack, she claimed that the police only asked if the assailant said 
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anything. R. 359: 71-72. Further, she reasoned that she did not specifically direct any 
comments to the assailant but rather she Mjust spoke into thin air, really." R. 359: 71-72. 
Throughout the trial, Judge J. Dennis Frederick raised objections sua sponte and 
instructed the attorneys to hurry the case along.2 Judge Frederick objected approximately 
30 times during both attorneys' examinations but he interrupted defense counsel twice as 
often as the prosecutor. As the trial progressed, Judge Frederick became increasingly 
intolerant and repeatedly instructed the attorneys, without an objection, to minimize 
repeating background and foundation evidence. 
For example, while cross-examining Officer Holdaway, defense counsel asked if 
prostitution was prevalent around Ms. Kuhel's residence. R. 359: 107-08. Judge 
Frederick interceded without the prosecutor objecting and ruled that the question was 
irrelevant. R. 359: 108. Defense counsel argued that the prevalence of prostitution 
supported Mr. Perez's encounter with the prostitute. R. 359: 108. At this point, the 
prosecutor requested defense counsel to restrict his question "to th[e] time frame" 
surrounding the crime. R. 359: 108. Judge Frederick ruled that he couldn'1 "see any 
relevance to" the existence of prostitution activity. R. 359: 108. Instead, he reasoned that 
Mr. Perez could "tell his story when he gets an opportunity, I suppose." R. 359: 108. 
When defense counsel started to explain his reasons for eliciting the evidence, Judge 
Frederick interrupted, "I understand what you are trying to establish." R. 359: 108. 
2For a complete list of Judge Frederick's actions, see infra pages 40 to 45. 
14 
Officer Wathan, offered expert testimony that in his "personal experience" fresh 
fingerprints have fine details that "pop" or "jump" out while older prints are less 
pronounced. R. 359: 114-15, 135. In this case, Officer Wathan found Mr. Perez's 
fingerprints using magnetic powder which works best on well-defined prints but not on 
older, less-pronounced ones. R. 359: 121, 134-35. Officer Wathan testified that when he 
found the prints on the window sill and on the window, the prints "jumped right out" and 
appeared to be fresh. R. 359: 123-26. 
On cross-examination, Officer Wathan explained that numerous factors affected 
the durability of fingerprints including the moisture and oil content of a person's hands, 
heat, humidity, condensation, exposure to light, and the surface conditions where the print 
is placed. R. 359: 133-35. He also concluded that fingerprints can remain preserved 
particularly long on hard flat surfaces such as glass and tile. R. 359: 133. 
On redirect examination, the prosecutor asked Officer Wathan if a year-old 
fingerprint would "pop up." R. 359: 155. Defense counsel objected citing inadequate 
foundation and the lack of notice that Officer Wathan would serve as "an expert on the 
time and place of the fingerprints." R. 359: 156. Judge Frederick ruled that Officer 
Wathan was qualified to give an opinion "with regard to print viability after a period of a 
year or any other time period after that." R. 359: 156. Defense counsel protested that 
even if Officer Wathan was qualified to give such an opinion, the State failed to notify the 
defense that it planned to present expert testimony on the durability of fingerprints. R. 
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359: 156. Judge Frederick concluded that because "the time frame . . . is an important 
consideration," Officer Wathan's testimony concerning the "recent placing of a latent 
fingerprint" justified admitting his testimony. R. 359: 156. Officer Wathan then testified 
that a year-old print would not have popped up "as quickly and as pronounced as it did in 
this particular occasion." R. 359: 157. 
INS Agent Phillip Earnest testified that he interpreted for Detective Norton during 
the initial portion of Mr. Perez's interrogation. R. 359: 166-67. Detective Norton was 
waiting for INS Agent Jeff Hoover to arrive to interpret but Agent Hoover was late. 
When Agent Earnest saw that Agent Hoover was delayed, he offered to interpret for 
Detective Norton. R. 359: 167; 360: 223. 
Although Agent Earnest claimed to be "competent" in Spanish, he admitted that 
he was not fluent and that he did not understand many phrases or the connotations of 
some words. R. 359: 169-73. Thus, he could not "fully translate" English and Spanish. 
R. 359: 173. In this particular case, Agent Earnest had difficulty understanding Mr. 
Perez, he could not translate some of Detective Norton's questions into Spanish, and he 
frequently lapsed into English when he interpreted for Mr. Perez. R. 359: 188-89; Exhibit 
3 at 1-4. He also mistranslated words, erroneously conjugated verbs, and misused 
pronouns. Exhibit 3 at 1-4. 
Because Detective Norton tape recorded the interrogation, neither he nor Agent 
Earnest took any notes. R. 359: 181; 360: 222, 225. During the middle of the 
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interrogation, Agent Hoover arrived and relieved Agent Earnest. R. 359: 177; 360: 227, 
233. After completing the interview, Detective Norton used the same tape to interview 
another defendant which resulted in his taping over the first half of the interrogation with 
Mr. Perez. R. 360: 224. Agent Earnest conceded that Detective Norton had alerted him 
of the erasure. R. 359: 182. The remaining recorded portion contains only the last few 
minutes of Agent Earnest's interpreting plus Agent Hoover's entire involvement. R. 359: 
185; 360: 227; Exhibit 3 at 4. Thus, the only evidence of the first half of Mr. Perez's 
interview is Agent Earnest's and Detective Norton's memories. 
Agent Earnest testified that during the taped over portion of the interview, he 
thought that Mr. Perez admitted to entering the apartment a week or a month before the 
October 5, 1999, interview but he could not specifically recall what Mr. Perez said. R. 
359: 177-78. The attack occurred on August 9, 1999. Agent Earnest conceded that he 
only had a "very vague" recollection of the interrogation. R. 359: 176. In fact, because 
he interviews numerous people on a daily basis, he must fingerprint each interviewee so 
he can confirm that he actually questioned a specific person. R. 359: 174-75. To refresh 
his recollection before testifying, Agent Earnest reviewed a transcript of the remaining 
portion of the tape recording. R. 359: 183. 
The transcript reveals that Agent Earnest's memory of the interrogation was faulty. 
Although he testified that Mr. Perez admitted to being with the men in the camper when 
Ms. Kuhel yelled at them, Mr. Perez denied ever having any problem with Ms. Kuhel or 
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associating with the men in the camper. R. 359: 176; Exhibit 3 at 2-4. Agent Earnest 
also mistakenly remembered Mr. Perez revealing that he entered the apartment to have a 
sexual encounter. R. 359: 176. Mr. Perez did not explain this part of his story until after 
Agent Hoover assumed interpreting duties. Exhibit 3 at 1-4, 16. 
Following Agent Earnest's direct testimony, Judge Frederick sua sponte 
summarized Agent Earnest's involvement as follows: "He happened along., offered a 
good deed which has not gone unpunished; has it Agent?" R. 359: 179. Agent Earnest 
replied, "Yes, sir, it has." R. 359: 179. Defense counsel then began cross-examination. 
Detective Norton testified that during the taped over portion of the interview Mr. 
Perez denied ever entering the apartment. R. 360: 227. According to Detective Norton, 
Mr. Perez only admitted to being inside the apartment when he was confronted with the 
fingerprint evidence. R. 360: 227. But, on cross-examination, Detective Norton clarified 
that Mr. Perez had consistently admitted entering the apartment but he denied any 
involvement in the assault. R. 360: 243. Detective Norton contended further that during 
the unrecorded portion of the interrogation Mr. Perez admitted that he entered the 
apartment "a month or so" prior to the interview. R. 360: 227-28. Mr. Perez mentioned 
no time frame during the recorded portion. 
Also on cross-examination, defense counsel began to ask Detective Norton 
whether the area where the crime occurred was "notorious" for certain types of criminal 
activity. R. 360: 252. The prosecutor objected because the question had no "basis in 
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fact." R. 360: 252. Judge Frederick ruled that the question was irrelevant. R. 360: 252. 
A defense expert in English/Spanish translation, Martha Hannan, translated the 
tape-recorded portion of Mr. Perez's interrogation. R. 360: 254-55. She testified that both 
Agent Earnest and Agent Hoover lacked basic interpreting skills. Specifically, they 
mixed Spanish and English, committed numerous grammatical errors, did not correctly or 
folly interpret Mr. Perez's and Detective Norton's responses, added information, and 
could not understand Mr. Perez at times. R. 360: 255-56, 260. Ms. Hannan summarized 
that although a person may be able to speak Spanish, interpreting requires the ability to 
"manipulate the language and convey exactly what is being said." R. 360: 258-59. She 
concluded that, rather than acting as interpreters, the agents simply served as additional 
interrogators. R. 360: 255-56. 
In fact, the transcription of the interrogation reveals that when Mr. Perez explained 
about entering the vacant apartment with the prostitute, Agent Hoover and Detective 
Norton thought he was referring to the attack on Ms. Kuhel. Exhibit 3 at 4-11. On cross-
examination, Ms. Hannan agreed that despite the poor interpreting, Mr. Perez admitted to 
entering the apartment without permission and having intercourse there with a prostitute. 
R. 360: 263-64. Ms. Hannan also noted that although Mr. Perez responded twice to 
Detective Norton's English language questions, he did not appear to understand the 
questions and he responded in Spanish, not English. R. 360: 262, 266. 
Following the prosecutor's re-cross-examination, Judge Frederick asked Ms. 
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Hannan if she had "any independent knowledge of Mr. Perez' ability to use the English 
Language?" R. 360: 266. Ms. Hannan replied, "No." R. 360: 266. Judge Frederick then 
excused her. R. 360: 266. 
During the jury instruction conference, defense counsel began to stale his 
objections on the record but Judge Frederick interrupted, "Well, let's move it on, then. 
We are kind of fumbling around here. You are — you need to make your exceptions so 
we can get on with it." R. 360: 280. Defense counsel explained that he was trying to 
move quickly but he had just received the State's proposed instructions. R. 360: 280. 
Defense counsel then objected to the instructions on attempted murder. R. 360: 
281. Those instructions listed three alternative theories: an intent to kill; an intent to 
inflict serious bodily injury; and depraved indifference to human life. R. 304-08. 
Defense counsel argued that the facts could only support murder based on an intent to 
kill. R. 360: 281. Judge Frederick hurried through the conference and never specifically 
addressed defense counsel's concerns. R. 360: 280-81. Nevertheless, he charged the jury 
on all three theories for attempted murder. R. 304-08; Addendum G. 
Judge Frederick also gave a standard jury instruction concerning his views on the 
evidence. He informed the jurors that they were the sole judges of the facts and that they 
should not consider any of his statements or opinions on the evidence. R. 311. Judge 
Frederick cautioned the jurors that if he had expressed an opinion on the evidence or the 
credibility of witnesses, the jurors should disregard the opinion and decide the facts 
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themselves. R. 285, 288, 311. He also explained the State's burden of proof and Mr. 
Perez's right to remain silent. R. 283, 286, 289. 
After instructing the jury, Judge Frederick began to move on to closing arguments, 
but the interpreter stated that she had not completed interpreting the jury instructions for 
Mr. Perez. R. 360: 283. Judge Frederick instructed her to stop interpreting the jury 
instructions and to finish them following closing arguments. R. 360: 283. 
During its deliberations, the jury sent Judge Frederick a note asking him to "Please 
clarify the direction and index (which hand and direction) from States [sic] evidence # 2 
and States [sic] #11. R. 318; 360: 322. Exhibits two and 11 were pictures of the 
fingerprint found on the window sill. R. 359: 120, 129. Judge Frederick advised the jury 
to rely on their collective recollection of the evidence. R. 319; 360: 323. After resuming 
deliberations, the jury convicted Mr. Perez of aggravated burglary and attempted murder. 
R. 320, 321. 
Sentencing 
The presentence investigation revealed that Mr. Perez was raised in Mexico, along 
with eight siblings, by both of his parents. R. 356: 6. While in Mexico, he received six 
years of formal education. R. 356: 7. Although he had no history of drug abuse, he 
began using alcohol at the age of 18. R. 356: 8. He expressed a desire to participate in 
alcohol counseling because he wanted to completely abstain from alcohol. R. 356: 8. 
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At the age of 22, Mr. Perez illegally immigrated to Utah to "get ahead in life." R. 
356: 6, 9. Although Mr. Perez never married, he left behind two dependent children with 
their mother. R. 356: 6. While living in Utah for the past four years he worked in 
construction and as a factory worker. R. 356: 8. 
At the time of the presentence investigation, Mr. Perez was 26 years old. R. 356: 
1. He continued to deny assaulting Ms. Kuhel and he maintained that he only entered the 
apartment when it was vacant with the prostitute. R. 356: 3. His only prior convictions 
consisted of two offenses for driving under the influence of alcohol. R. 356: 5. He 
received jail terms for each offense and he had never violated probation. R. 356: 6. 
Ms. Kuhel reported that in addition to her physical injuries, she was receiving 
mental health counseling twice a month. R. 356: 4. She entrusted the court system to 
impose an appropriate sentence. R. 356: 4. Given Ms. Kuhel's injuries and Mr. Perez's 
denial of responsibility, the Department of Probation and Parole ("DPP") recommended 
long-term incarceration but concurrent sentences. R. 356: 10-11. 
Judge Frederick sentenced Mr. Perez on May 26, 2000. R. 361. Mr. Perez 
declined to speak at sentencing. As defense counsel explained, because Mr. Perez 
continued to maintain his innocence any statements by him would have been futile. R. 
361:6. Rather, defense counsel urged Judge Frederick to consider probation. R. 361: 6. 
The prosecutor noted Mr. Perez's refusal to accept responsibility and the violent 
nature of the crimes. R. 361: 7-8. He, accordingly, suggested following DPP's 
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sentencing recommendation. R. 356: 8. 
Judge Frederick expressed his view that the jury had correctly convicted Mr. Perez 
and that crimes were "egregious." R. 361: 8. He concluded that "in this civilized society 
[the crimes] cannot and will not be tolerated." R. 361: 8. He, therefore, imposed a 
sentence of five years to life for aggravated burglary and a sentence of one to fifteen years 
for attempted murder and ordered them to run consecutively. R. 361: 8. 
Defense counsel objected to the consecutive sentences because he claimed that the 
crimes involved a single criminal episode and there were no aggravating factors. R. 361: 
9. Judge Frederick disagreed and viewed the crimes as separate incidents. R. 361: 9-10. 
He added, "if I was to grant him concurrent terms at the prison your ultimate appeal 
wouldn't have near the poignancy." R. 361: 10. This appeal followed. R. 334. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial judge erred in instructing the jury on attempted murder based on 
depraved indifference to human life. Attempted depraved indifference murder is not a 
crime in Utah. When the trial court instructs the jury on that theory of attempted murder, 
this Court must reverse and remand for a new trial. 
The State's failure to notify the defense that it planned to admit Officer Wathan's 
opinion on the recency of the fingerprints prevented defense counsel from preparing for 
trial. Defense counsel repeatedly requested the State to disclose its fingerprint evidence 
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but the State claimed it had none. The State even affirmatively represented that if it 
obtained expert fingerprint evidence it would disclose it. When the State failed to do so., 
defense counsel assumed that the State's experts could not determine when Mr. Perez 
placed the fingerprints in the apartment. The State's omission constituted two separate 
violations of law. First, Utah's expert notification statute required the State to notify 
defense counsel 30 days prior to trial of Officer Wathan's testimony. Second, the State 
violated its continuing duty to disclose inculpatory evidence upon request under Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 16. Because defense counsel had no opportunity to prepare to meet 
Officer Wathan's testimony, the trial judge abused his discretion in failing to continue the 
trial and in admitting Officer Wathan's testimony. 
The trial judge's repeated hostility toward the defense deprived Mr. Perez of a fair 
trial. Although trial judges may explain or clarify the evidence, they may nol show a 
preference for either party. The trial judge repeatedly interrupted defense counsel without 
an objection, bolstered the State's witnesses, barred defense counsel from flilly presenting 
the defense theory, commented on Mr. Perez's veracity and his right to remain silent, and 
shifted the burden of proof to the defense. Because the State's case turned on the 
credibility of its witnesses, the trial judge's conduct deprived Mr. Perez of a fair trial. 
At sentencing, rather than considering the favorable sentencing factors, the trial 
judge focused exclusively on the seriousness of the offenses. He also unveiled his 
hostility toward Mr. Perez when he stated that the jury correctly convicted Mr. Perez, he 
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would not tolerate Mr. Perez's crimes, and that consecutive sentences would render Mr. 
Perez's appeal more "poignan[t].ff The trial judge's bias and failure to consider all 
sentencing factors was an abuse of discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY ON THE NON-EXISTENT CRIME OF 
ATTEMPTED DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE MURDER 
Because the jury may have convicted Mr. Perez of the non-existent crime of 
attempted depraved indifference murder, this Court must reverse that conviction. In State 
v. VigiL 842 P.2d 843 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court ruled that attempt crimes are 
limited to those "offenses with a mental state of 'intent.'" Id. at 846 (quoting Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-4-101(2) (1990)). The Court ruled further that because depraved indifference 
murder requires only a "knowing" mental state, a person could not be convicted of 
attempted depraved indifference murder. Id. at 844, 848. 
The trial judge instructed the jury on three alternative theories for attempted 
murder: an intent to kill, an intent to inflict serious bodily injury, and depraved 
indifference to human life. R. 304-08; Addendum G. Because the trial judge instructed 
the jury on a non-existent crime, this Court must reverse the murder conviction. State v. 
Haston, 846 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1993). In Haston, just as in this case, the trial judge 
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instructed the jury on attempted murder based on an intent to kill, an intent to inflict 
serious bodily injury, and depraved indifference to human life. Id The Supreme Court 
ruled that "[s]ince the jury was allowed to consider the depraved indifference alternative , 
. . defendant is entitled to a new trial." IdL; see also State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150, 1159 
(Utah 1991) (reversing murder conviction because court could not determine whether jury 
unanimously decided the elements of the offense). This case is indistinguishable. 
Defense counsel preserved this issue by specifically requesting the trial judge not 
to instruct the jury on the depraved indifference theory of attempted murder. R. 360: 281. 
Even if he had not done so, the Supreme Court ruled in Haston that because convicting a 
person of a non-existent crime "would constitute manifest injustice," the Court reviewed 
the Appellant's claim despite his failure to raise it in the trial court. 846 P.2d at 1277. 
Likewise, the prospect of Mr. Perez being convicted of a non-existent crime requires 
reversal of his attempted murder conviction. 
II. THE STATE'S FAILURE TO NOTIFY THE DEFENSE 
PRIOR TO TRIAL OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 
CONCERNING THE RECENCY OF THE 
FINGERPRINTS REQUIRED A CONTINUANCE OR 
EXCLUDING THE TESTIMONY BECAUSE IT 
SEVERELY PREJUDICED THE DEFENSE 
The State violated the expert notification statute when it failed to notify Mr. Perez 
of its plans to admit Officer Wathan's testimony concerning the recency of the 
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fingerprints. The lack of notice also constituted a discovery rule violation because the 
defense requested and the State agreed to disclose the evidence. Because Officer 
Wathan's unrebutted testimony provided the only credible evidence of when Mr. Perez 
had entered the apartment, its admission severely harmed the defense. The trial judge 
abused his discretion in admitting the expert testimony and in failing to continue the trial 
to allow Mr. Perez to prepare to meet the evidence. 
A. The Trial Judge Abused His Discretion in 
Failing to Continue the Trial When the State 
Failed to Notify the Defense of its Intent to 
Present Critical Expert Testimony 
The State's failure to provide notice of Officer Wathan's testimony prevented the 
defense from sufficiently preparing for trial. Utah Code Annotated section 
77-17-13(l)(a) (1999) ("the expert notification statute"), provides that in a felony case, a 
party intending to admit expert testimony must notify the opposing party "as soon as 
practicable but not less than 30 days before trial." This notice includes "the name and 
address of the expert, the expert's curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's report." Id. 
§ 77-17-13(1 )(b). The written report should include "the substance of the expert's 
proposed testimony including any opinion and the bases and reasons of that opinion . . . 
sufficient to give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony." 
Id. § 77-17-13(2)(b). Should a party fail to meet these requirements, the opposing party 
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"shall be entitled to a continuance of the trial or hearing sufficient to allow preparation to 
meet the testimony." Id. § 77-17-13(4)(a). But, the statute limits the court's discretion to 
impose other "sanctions," such as excluding expert testimony, except upon finding bad 
faith. I&§77-17-13(4)(b). 
The State provided no notice at all that it planned to offer Officer Wathan's expert 
opinion that Mr. Perez's fingerprints had been recently placed on the window and 
window sill. Instead, it notified Mr. Perez two weeks before trial that Officer Burgon 
would testify that the fingerprints found at the apartment matched Mr. Perez's. The State 
never even hinted that Officer Wathan would conclude that the fingerprints were recently 
placed. Thus, the lack of notice deprived Mr. Perez an opportunity to "prepar[e] to meet 
the testimony." Id. 
This Court has ruled that despite the expert notification statute's mandatory 
language, that statute's goal of ensuring sufficient preparation gives the trial court 
discretion to consider "the amount of notice given and the amount of time needed" to 
prepare to meet the expert testimony. State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998). In reviewing the trial court's failure to continue a trial based on the lack of 
notice of expert testimony, this Court considers four factors: 
(1) the extent of appellant's diligence in his efforts to ready his 
defense prior to the date set for trial; (2) the likelihood that the 
need for a continuance could have been met if the continuance 
had been granted; (3) the extent to which granting the 
continuance would have inconvenienced the court and the 
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opposing party; and (4) the extent to which the appellant might 
have suffered harm as a result of the court's denial. 
State v. Begishe. 937 P.2d 527, 530 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). These factors required the trial 
judge to continue the trial below. 
First, defense counsel requested the State to disclose its expert witness testimony 
on, at least, four separate occasions. In his initial discovery request, defense counsel 
demanded a list of all "inculpatory evidence" and the names, addresses, and telephone 
numbers of all potential witnesses. R. 10. Defense counsel further requested all "reports 
or results of scientific tests" and "[a]ny police or investigative reports." R. 11. In his 
second request for discovery, defense counsel specifically requested "[a]ll reports, 
documents and other information related to any fingerprint evidence and analysis 
conducted . . . ." R. 19. The State denied possessing any fingerprint reports, but it 
assured the defense that it would "strictly comply with the mandates of Rule 16 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure." R. 21. 
Believing that fingerprint reports existed, defense counsel filed a motion to compel 
the State to produce the reports. R. 23. Then, several weeks before trial, defense counsel 
notified the State that he may call an expert to testify on fingerprint analysis. R. 155. In 
the notice, defense counsel invited the State to disclose its experts "[s]ince defendant has 
not yet received full discovery or an expert witness notice from the State on" fingerprint 
analysis. R. 155. Two weeks before trial, the State filed a notice of an intent to call 
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Detective Burgon as an expert witness on fingerprint analysis but mentioned nothing 
about Officer Wathan. R. 159. 
Defense counsel diligently sought the State's fingerprint evidence to prepare for 
trial. The State ignored these efforts and affirmatively represented that the only expert it 
planned to present was Officer Burgon on matching the prints to Mr. Perez. This Court 
has ruled that the expert notification statute "makes it the State's duty to initially disclose 
witnesses in compliance with the statutory requirements." Arellano, 964 P.2d at 1171. 
Here, defense counsel's multiple requests for disclosure gave the State "ample 
opportunity" to disclose Officer Wathan's conclusions, and, yet it declined to do so. Id 
Second, Mr. Perez needed a continuance to "fully analyze" Officer Wathan's 
expert opinion. Begishe, 937 P.2d at 530. Because the State impliedly represented that it 
planned to present no expert testimony on the durability of fingerprints, defense counsel 
did not prepare to address this issue. As demonstrated in his opening statement, defense 
counsel assumed that he could rebut the State's fingerprint evidence simply by showing 
that "fingerprints can last a long time." R. 359: 41-42. Although defense counsel had 
retained a fingerprint expert for trial, a continuance was needed to allow defense counsel 
time to test the specific environmental conditions on the window in Ms. Kuhel's 
apartment. Additional time would have also allowed defense counsel an opportunity "to 
consult with his own expert and then incorporate any new information into the defense 
strategy." Arellano, 964 P.2d at 1171. 
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Defense counsel had no duty to "anticipate and prepare for all potential, yet 
undisclosed, expert witnesses." Id. A continuance was essential for defense counsel to 
"acquire the expert of his choice" to challenge Officer Wathan's opinion. Begishe. 937 
P.2d at 530. The failure to continue the trial, thus, prevented defense counsel from 
developing a "comprehensive trial strategy." Id. 
Third, although a continuance would have inconvenienced the trial court, the jury 
and the witnesses, "the appellant's right to a fair trial outweighs this administrative 
concern." Id. at 531; see also Arellano, 964 P.2d at 1170 (adopting this same holding 
from Begishe). Given the State's "extreme tardiness" in failing to notify the defense, 
"any inconvenience to the State caused by a continuance would have been fully justified." 
Begishe, 937 P.2d at 530-31. 
Fourth, because Officer Wathan provided the only credible evidence supporting 
the State's theory of when Mr. Perez entered the apartment, the trial judge's failure to 
allow Mr. Perez a continuance to contest that evidence severely prejudiced the defense. 
In reviewing whether the lack of notice prejudiced a criminal defendant, this Court has 
recognized that "it is difficult to determine how the defense's actions would have been 
affected had the expert witness been timely disclosed." Arellano. 964 P.2d at 1171. 
Recognizing this difficulty, this Court "shift[s] the burden of proving prejudice from the 
defendant to the State in cases in which the defendant can credibly argue that it was the 
prosecution's error that impaired the defense." IdL It is undisputed that the State ignored 
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the defense's discovery requests and failed to disclose Officer Wathan's opinion. Thus, 
the State has the burden of proving the lack of prejudice. Id 
The State cannot meet this burden. Although Ms. Kuhel, Agent Earnest, and 
Detective Norton offered circumstantial evidence of the timing of Mr. Perez's entry into 
the apartment, their testimony lacked reliability. Ms. Kuhel's entire testimony lacked 
credibility concerning the assailant's identity. Her claims that she had numerous 
confrontations with Mr. Perez are completely at odds with her failure to identify him in 
the photo array. Moreover, Ms. Kuhel admitted that she knew that Mr. Perez lived above 
her and she claimed to have seen him fixing his car every day. Further, Mr. Perez has a 
prominent birthmark on his forehead which somehow escaped Ms. Kuhel's memory. 
Exhibit 18. 
Despite these extensive alleged contacts and Mr. Perez's distinctive appearance, 
Ms. Kuhel could not identify him "at all" at the photo array. R. 357: 47; 360: 249. Her 
excuse for not acknowledging her familiarity with Mr. Perez prior to trial—her fear of not 
proving her allegation—simply rings hollow. 
Ms. Kuhel also embellished details about the assault itself which she had never 
raised previously including her statements during the attack, the assailant's attempt to exit 
through the front door, and his use of the chair to flee. She also claimed that she was 
awake before the assailant entered even though at the time of the attack she stated that she 
was sleeping. Her claim that the police never asked her if she said anything during the 
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attack is not plausible. It should also be noted that had the assailant used the chair and 
placed his hands on the counter top as Ms. Kuhel alleged, Officer Wathan would have 
likely found Mr. Perez's fingerprints there. 
Other elements of Ms. Kuhel5s story suggest that she tailored her testimony to 
strengthen the case against Mr. Perez. She gave conflicting reports about whether she 
actually confronted the men in the camper instead of simply yelling at them from her 
window. Further, her statement that the assailant "smelled" Hispanic reeks of racism. R. 
359: 102. Her contention that Mr. Perez repeatedly threatened her in English belies Mr. 
Perez's limited language skills and his lack of education. 
Moreover, Ms. Kuhel did not claim that she thoroughly cleaned the apartment until 
she knew of Mr. Perez's contention that he entered the apartment before she moved in. 
And, contrary to Ms. Kuhel's claims that she regularly cleaned, Officer Wathan found 
numerous smudged fingerprints on the window, window sill and counter top. R. 359: 
123, 147; Exhibits 1, 2, 4. Ms. Kuhel's chronic illnesses, damaged spine, and use of a 
cane, cast further doubt on her claim that she cleaned the window. R. 359: 58, 64. To 
wash both sides of the basement window would have required her either to reach across 
the kitchen counter, to climb on top of it, or to wash it from the outside by reaching down 
to ground level. Exhibits 4, 5, 8, 12, 13. Ms. Kuhel's physical condition would have 
made these efforts difficult. 
Detective Norton's testimony similarly lacked credibility. He relied solely on 
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Agent Earnest's incomplete and inadequate interpreting to understand Mr. Perez's 
responses. As the defense expert pointed out, Agent Earnest did not accurately or fully 
relay Mr. Perez's answers. As a result, Detective Norton was confused throughout the 
interrogation and believed that Mr. Perez referred to the attack on Ms. Kuhel when 
actually he described the sexual encounter with the prostitute. Moreover, his extreme 
bias against Mr. Perez undermines his credibility. The transcript of the interrogation 
reveals that Detective Norton had concluded that Mr. Perez was guilty. Throughout the 
interrogation, Detective Norton refused to accept Mr. Perez's explanation for the 
fingerprints and repeatedly accused Mr. Perez of lying. He disregarded the fact that the 
direction of the fingerprints were consistent with Mr. Perez's claim that he only entered 
and did not exit the apartment through the window. Rather than investigating the veracity 
of Mr. Perez's story, Detective Norton concluded that the fingerprints supported the entire 
case against Mr. Perez. In fact, the police never even investigated the prime suspects—the 
men in the camper whom Ms. Kuhel had confronted. 
Detective Norton unveiled his bias during the interrogation when he accused Mr. 
Perez of feigning his ability to understand English. Exhibit 3 at 17-19. Detective Norton 
labeled Mr. Perez as the stereotypical lying, illegal alien who knew more English than he 
admitted. It is also suspicious that purportedly Mr. Perez only mentioned the time frame 
for entering the apartment on the taped over portion of the interrogation. Mr. Perez never 
referred to the time frame during the recorded portion even though that issue was critical 
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to the State's case. 
Agent Earnest's testimony that Mr. Perez admitted to entering the apartment a 
week or a month before the interrogation likewise lacked reliability. Agent Earnest 
admitted that he had difficulty understanding Mr. Perez and interpreting the Spanish 
language. Even more telling, he only had a vague memory of the interview and he 
conceded that because he conducts so many interviews he must fingerprint each 
interviewee so that he can ensure that he actually interviewed a particular person. In fact, 
the only statements he claimed to have remembered Mr. Perez making proved to have 
occurred when he wasn't even present. Rather, his recollection of the interview appears 
to have stemmed from his pretrial review of the interview transcript and not from his own 
memory. As an added consideration, Detective Norton's tipping off Agent Earnest that 
he taped over the first part of the interview, may have biased Agent Earnest. 
Without a recording of the first half of the interrogation, the State cannot rely on 
Agent Earnest's and Detective Norton's testimony to meet its burden of showing lack of 
prejudice. As this Court ruled in Arellano, "if any party should suffer from the 
uncertainty, it should be the party at fault." 964 P.2d at 1171. 
Having discredited Ms. Kuhel's, Detective Norton's and Agent Earnest's 
testimony, Officer Wathan provided the only remaining evidence that linked Mr. Perez to 
the crimes. But, the State's failure to notify the defense led defense counsel to believe 
that the State had no expert testimony on the recency of the fingerprints. Defense counsel 
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"pursued tactics and strategies with this assumption in mind." Begishe, 937 P.2d at 531. 
Relying on the State's implicit representations, defense counsel represented during 
opening statements that the fingerprint experts could only conclude that "fingerprints can 
last a long time." R. 359: 41-42. When defense counsel could not counter Officer 
Wathan's opinion, defense counsel's "credibility in the eyes of the jury was greatly 
compromised." Begishe, 937 P.2d at 531. Under similar circumstances, this Court ruled 
that the State's omissions irreparably harmed the defense. Id. 
The jury's question to the trial judge about the direction of the fingerprints 
demonstrates that the jury focused on the fingerprint evidence. Because, the direction of 
prints was consistent with Mr. Perez's defense theory that he only entered the apartment, 
the only question for the jury was the timing of the prints. The failure to rebut Officer 
Wathan's testimony was, thus, the pivotal question for the jury. 
Although defense counsel failed to request a continuance, the expert notification 
statute provides that trial judges "shall" continue a trial when the opposing party fails to 
give notice of expert testimony. Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(4)(a) (1999). In any event, 
the trial judge plainly erred in failing to continue the trial. To establish plain error, the 
appellant must demonstrate (1) the existence of an error; (2) "the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court;" and (3) "absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, [] confidence in the 
verdict is undermined." State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
3€ 
The State plainly violated the expert notification statute. In addition, the case law 
clearly spells out that the factors trial judges must consider in deciding whether to 
continue a trial supported a continuance. And, finally, because Officer Wathan offered 
the only credible testimony supporting the State's theory of when Mr. Perez entered the 
apartment, the lack of notice severely prejudiced the defense. As this Court ruled in 
Begishe, when the trial court admits surprise expert evidence that has "'critical' 
significance," the failure to continue the trial prejudices the defendant. 937 P.2d at 531 
(quoting trial court). The trial judge abused his discretion in failing to continue the trial. 
B. The State's Failure to Disclose Requested 
Inculpatory Evidence Required Exclusion of 
that Evidence 
The trial judge also abused his discretion in admitting the evidence when the State 
failed to follow discovery rules. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(3) requires 
prosecutors "to disclose upon request... physical evidence seized from the defendant^ ]" 
Once a defendant requests such evidence, M[t]he State has the duty to produce inculpatory 
evidence fully and forthrightly to avoid misleading the defense." Begishe, 937 P.2d at 
532; see State v. Knight 734 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah 1987). Despite defense counsel's four 
separate requests for all inculpatory evidence relating to the fingerprints, the State failed 
to disclose Officer Wathan's findings. 
The Utah Supreme Court applies a four-part test for determining whether to 
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exclude inculpatory prosecution evidence which the defendant has requested: 
In ruling on a motion to exclude prosecution evidence because 
of a failure to make a full and accurate response to a defendants 
request, a trial judge must consider and weigh a number of 
factors, such as (1) the extent to which the prosecution's 
representation is actually inaccurate, (2) the tendency of the 
omission or misstatement to lead defense counsel into tactics or 
strategy that could prejudice the outcome, (3) the culpability of 
the prosecutor in omitting pertinent information or misstating 
the facts, and (4) the extent to which appropriate defense 
investigation would have discovered the omitted or misstated 
evidence. 
State v. Kallin. 877 P.2d 138, 143 (Utah 1994). 
This test required exclusion of the evidence. First, the State repeatedly represented 
that it did not possess any fingerprint evidence. The State even assured the trial court and 
defense counsel that it would "strictly comply with the mandates of Rule 16 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure." R. 21. Thus, the State representations were completely 
inaccurate. 
Second, as his opening statement proves, defense counsel planned his defense 
strategy under the assumption that the State could not determine when Mr. Perez placed 
his fingerprints in the apartment. As discussed above, the absence of other credible 
evidence meant that it was vital for the defense to challenge Officer Wathan's subjective 
opinion. Instead, the State's failure to disclose Officer Wathan's conclusions gave 
defense counsel a false sense of security. 
Third, the prosecutor was solely culpable in failing to reveal the evidence. 
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Defense counsel repeatedly begged the State to disclose the fingerprint evidence. He 
even specifically requested all "inculpatory evidence." R. 10. Despite these requests, the 
State refused to disclose the evidence and even affirmatively represented that it would 
"strictly comply" with discovery rules. R. 21. 
Fourth, no amount of investigation by the defense would have revealed Officer 
Wathan's conclusion that the fingerprints had been recently placed. The State possessed 
the fingerprint evidence and only it knew of Officer Wathan's conclusions. Had defense 
counsel sent a fingerprint expert to the apartment months after the crime, the fingerprints 
likely would have been altered or removed. The defense simply could not have done 
anything to challenge Officer Wathan's opinion without the State disclosing the evidence. 
These factors inescapably lead to the conclusion that the trial judge abused his 
discretion in admitting the testimony. The trial judge's refusal to exclude the evidence 
severely harmed the defense because Officer Wathan's testimony proved to be outcome 
determinative. A new trial is needed to remedy the trial judge's mistake. 
III. THE TRIAL JUDGE DEPRIVED MR. PEREZ OF A FAIR 
TRIAL BY REPEATEDLY INJECTING HIMSELF INTO 
THE TRIAL, ENDORSING THE STATE'S CASE, AND 
DISPARAGING THE DEFENSE 
Throughout the trial, the trial judge sua sponte raised objections, rushed the 
attorneys, and commented on the evidence. He also criticized defense counsel's handling 
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of the case, bolstered the credibility of the State's witnesses, excluded relevant evidence 
supporting the defense theory, and commented on Mr. Perez's right to remain silent. 
Given the minimal evidence connecting Mr. Perez to the crimes, the trial judge's conduct 
altered the jury's deliberations. 
The trial judge's conduct deprived Mr. Perez of his right to a fair trial. Criminal 
defendants have a right to a "fair and impartial [court], committed to the purpose of 
seeking truth and doing justice, without bias or prejudice, fear or favor." State v. Mellen, 
583 P.2d 46, 48, (Utah 1978). "In pursuing that objective, it is not to be questioned that, 
particularly in a jury trial, a judge should maintain an attitude of neutrality and should 
not, either by his comments or demeanor, indicate his opinions either as to the credibility 
of evidence or on the disputed issues of fact." Id 
The trial judge repeatedly violated these duties. Although he interrupted both 
attorneys, he disproportionately criticized defense counsel's handling of the trial. The 
trial judge objected to defense counsel's handling of witnesses on, at least, 19 separate 
occasions. R. 359: 75-76, 108, 142, 143, 149, 152, 160, 163, 182-83; 360: 235, 241, 247, 
251, 255-56, 257, 257-58, 266 (twice), 280. The trial judge interrupted the prosecutor 
only nine times. R. 359: 159, 171; 360: 222, 224, 226, 230, 263, 272 (twice). The trial 
judge objected because he accused the attorneys of positing leading questions, repeating 
background and foundation testimony, and failing to clearly and directly pose questions. 
The trial judge also rushed defense counsel through the trial even though the 
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prosecutor had no objection. R. 359: 163; 360: 251, 255-56, 257, 266. Although he also 
rushed the prosecutor through one witness's testimony, he seemed far more intolerant of 
defense counsel. R. 360: 222, 224, 226. Specifically, when defense counsel requested a 
recess to use the bathroom, the trial judge ruled "We'll grant a favor to Counsel this one 
time." R. 359: 109. He then instructed defense counsel, "Ten minutes, Mr. Williams." 
R. 359: 109. Then, during the jury instruction conference, the trial judge resisted defense 
counsel's attempts to place his objections on the record even though counsel had just 
received the State's proposed instructions. Instead, he ordered defense counsel to "get on 
with it." R. 360: 280. Similarly, after reading the instructions to the jury, the trial judge 
refused to wait for the interpreter to finish interpreting the jury instructions for Mr. Perez 
and he ordered her to complete her interpreting after closing arguments. R. 360: 283-84. 
The trial judge's comments on the evidence repeatedly favored the State and 
disparaged the defense. Trial judges may comment on the evidence if the comments are 
"merely explanatory" and they assist the jury or the parties. State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 
975, 980 (Utah 1998). But, trial judges "may not comment on the weight of the evidence 
presented at trial or comment on the merits of the case in such a way that indicates a 
preference toward either party." IdL 
The trial judge repeatedly exceeded these limitations. In ruling on the defense 
motion to exclude Officer Wathan's testimony, the trial judge concluded that Officer 
Wathan was qualified to give his "opinion with regard to recent placing of a latent 
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fingerprint that he recovered." R. 359: 156 (emphasis added). This characterization 
bolstered Officer Wathan and "usurp[ed] the jury's exclusive function as the arbiter of 
questions of fact and the credibility of witnesses." People v. Cook, 658 P.2d 86, 91 (Cal. 
1983), overruled on other grounds, People v. Rodriguez, 726 P.2d 113, 135 (Cal. 1986). 
Following Agent Earnest's direct testimony, the trial judge spontaneously 
summarized the agent's involvement as "He happened along, offered a good deed which 
has not gone unpunished." R. 359: 179 (emphasis added). This portrayal of Agent 
Earnest as a Good Samaritan who "happened along" communicated to the jury that he 
acted honorably and that he had no stake in the trial's outcome. 
"As a general rule, the remarks of the judge during the trial in the presence of the 
jury indicating his opinion as to the credibility or lack of credibility of a witness 
constitutes error." State v. Garcia, 673 P.2d 955 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). As shown above, 
Agent's Earnest's credibility was vital to the defense case because he supplied the time 
frame for Mr. Perez's placing the fingerprints at the apartment. Agent Earnest's 
credibility was at issue because although he claimed to have remembered Mr. Perez's 
statements, he plainly did not. Also, as a law enforcement officer, he may haive has a bias 
against Mr. Perez. And, Detective Norton had tipped off Agent Earnest about the taped 
over portion of the interrogation. By sanitizing and approving of Agent Earnest's role, 
the trial judge bolstered the credibility of a pivotal witness for the jury. 
The trial judge also impliedly commented on the credibility of the evidence when 
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he asked Ms. Hannan about her knowledge of Mr. Perez's English abilities. Trial judges 
may ask witnesses questions when, in their judgment, it is "necessary or desirable to 
clarify, explain or add to the evidence as it relates to the disputed issues." State v. 
Mellen. 583 P.2d 46, 48 (Utah 1978). But, in asking questions, trial judges may not 
comment on the credibility of the witnesses of the strength of the State's case. IcL 
Here, the trial judge's question to Ms. Hannan about her lack of knowledge of Mr. 
Perez's English language skills undermined Ms. Hannan's opinion that Mr. Perez 
appeared not to understand English. The trial judge, thus, injected doubt about Mr. 
Perez's representation that he did not understand Detective Norton. In other words, the 
trial judge challenged Mr. Perez's veracity. 
The trial judge further prejudiced Mr. Perez by refusing to allow him to fully 
present his defense theory. First of all, the trial judge failed to continue the trial or to 
exclude Officer Wathan's testimony despite the lack of notice of expert testimony and the 
State's discovery rule violation. Then, without the prosecutor objecting to the substance 
of defense counsel's question, the trial judge ruled that Officer Holdaway could not 
testify about prostitution activity in the area around Ms. Kuhel's apartment because that 
evidence was irrelevant. R. 359: 108. The trial judge ruled similarly during Detective 
Norton's testimony. 
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that 
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it 
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would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401. Moreover, Utah Rule of Evidence 
402 presumes that "[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible." The prevalence of prostitution 
activity where the crime occurred would certainly render Mr. Perez's defense theory 
"more probable." Utah R. Evid. 401. Even the prosecutor initially agreed that, assuming 
defense counsel limited his inquiry to the "time frame" surrounding the crime, evidence 
of prostitution activity would have been relevant. R. 359: 108. But, the trial judge 
disallowed the testimony and even refused to allow defense counsel to state on the record 
his reasons for admitting the evidence. R. 359: 108. This conduct violated Mr. Perez's 
fundamental due process right to "establish a defense." Washington v. Texas. 388 U.S. 
14, 19 (1967), and it unfairly barred him from placing his objections on the record. 
People v. Vialpando. 809 P.2d 1082, 1084-85 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990). Further, the trial 
judge's brusque handling of defense counsel favored the State before the jury. 
Even more troubling, the trial judge ruled that the defense need not admit police 
testimony on prostitution activity because "the Defendant can tell his story when he gets 
an opportunity, I suppose." R. 359: 108. When Mr. Perez opted not to testify, the trial 
judge's remark became a comment on Mr. Perez's right not to testify. Such a comment 
by a judge "solemnizes the silence of the accused into evidence against him." Griffin v. 
California 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965). The trial judge's comment became "a penalty 
imposed by [the] courts for exercising a constitutional privilege" not to testify. Id.; see 
State v. Palmer 860 P.2d 339, 347 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (endorsing Griffin) 
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The trial judge's comment that Mr. Perez would have to substantiate his claims of 
prostitution activity could also be construed as implying that Mr. Perez had the burden of 
presenting evidence and establishing his innocence. Criminal defendants have a 
fundamental due process right to require the State to prove guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In re Winship. 397 U.S. 358, 362-64 (1970). This right is "indispensable1'to 
protecting the accused '"from dubious and unjust convictions[.]'" Id. (quoting Davis v. 
United States. 160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895)). The trial judge's comment shifted the burden 
of proof to Mr. Perez in violation of his due process rights. 
Although defense counsel failed to object to the trial judge's conduct, the trial 
judge's disdain for the defense would have rendered any attempt to challenge his 
handling of the case unavailing. "It is well established that the law does not require 
litigants to do a futile or vain act." Beltran v. Allan, 926 P.2d 892, 901 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996) (Billings, J., dissenting). The trial judge's commanding presence, contempt for the 
defense theory, and intolerance for delay clearly communicated his unwillingness to grant 
any relief. As Judge Greenwood concluded in Roundv v. Staley. 1999 UT App 229, f^ 6, 
984 P.2d 404, when the trial judge has demonstrated his or her view on a subject, any 
"further objection . . . would have been futile." 
Moreover, specifically pointing out the trial judge's failings to him would not have 
served the goals of preserving arguments. Preservation seeks mainly to give the trial 
court "an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it." State v. 
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Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah 1989). The trial judge's hostility toward the defense 
obviously threatened the fairness of the proceedings. Challenging the judge's handling of 
the case would have simply entrenched and agitated the trial judge. 
In any event, the trial judge's unfair handling of the case constituted plain error. 
State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). His unfair treatment of Mr. Perez's 
trial was error which should have been obvious. "It is well established that "[a] principal 
ingredient of due process is that every criminal defendant is entitled to a fair and impartial 
trial.' [Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 104 (6th Cir.1973), cert, denied. Kennedy v. 
Gray. 416 U.S. 959 (1974)]. A criminal defendant's right to a fair trial is a fundamental 
liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. Estelle v. Williams. 425 U.S. 501, 96 
S.Ct. 1691, 1692, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976)." State v. Mitchell 824 P.2d 469, 473 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). Further, the right to a fair trial demands that the trial judge conducts the trial 
fairly and impartially. Tumev v. Ohio. 273 U.S. 510, 531-34 (1927); State v. Mellen. 583 
P.2d 46, 48 (1978). The trial judge's disparaging comments and intolerance toward 
defense counsel and the defense case plainly violated these fundamental principles. 
The trial judge's conduct also affected the jury's verdict. His implicit endorsement 
of the State's case and his refusal to allow Mr. Perez to support his defense theory sealed 
Mr. Perez's fate. As the jury's question to the trial judge proves, Officer Wathan's expert 
testimony was pivotal to connecting Mr. Perez to the crime. The trial judge's 
characterization of the fingerprints as "recent" bolstered Officer Wathan and relieved the 
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jury of its fact-finding role on that issue. Judicial comments on such "disputed issues of 
fact" harm the defense "particularly in a jury trial " Mellen, 583 P.2d at 48. 
Compounding this endorsement of the State's case, the trial judge prevented Mr. 
Perez from rebutting Officer Wathan's opinion and he barred defense counsel from 
establishing the prevalence of prostitution activity where the crime occurred. 
The trial judge's comment that Mr. Perez could "tell his story" further prejudiced 
the jury. R. 359: 108. When Mr. Perez failed to testify, the trial judge's comment 
ffsolemnize[d] [Mr. Perez's] silence . . . into evidence against him." Griffin v. California 
380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965). Moreover, because the due process right to require the State to 
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is "indispensable," any confusion about the State's 
burden of proof in this close case cannot be ignored. Winship, 397 U.S. at 362. 
Because the State presented minimal evidence linking Mr. Perez to the crime, the 
trial judge's jury instructions on ignoring his comments, the right to silence and the 
State's burden of proof failed to blunt his prejudicial comments. This case is similar to 
People v. Vialpando. 809 P.2d 1082, 1084-85 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990), in which the trial 
judge repeatedly interrupted, showed irritation to and intolerance of defense counsel, and 
negatively commented on the defense case. The Colorado Court of Appeals ruled that 
even though the evidence "could well be considered overwhelming" the judge's conduct 
required retrial before a different judge. Given the lack of evidence linking Mr. Perez to 
the crimes, this case presents an even stronger argument for retrial before a new judge. 
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IV. THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION WHEN 
HE FAILED TO WEIGH ALL RELEVANT 
SENTENCING FACTORS AND IMPOSED 
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES 
The trial judge continued to treat Mr. Perez unfairly at sentencing. Rather than 
considering Mr. Perez's insignificant criminal history, stable background, and desire to 
better himself, the trial judge labeled Mr. Perez a bad actor and imposed consecutive 
sentences. His nonchalant handling of Mr. Perez's case requires resentencing. 
This Court must overturn a sentencing decision if "the trial court has abused its 
discretion, failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that 
exceeds legally prescribed limits." State v. Nuttalh 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). In determining whether to impose consecutive rather concurrent sentences, courts 
must weigh "the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant " Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) (1999). 
Under Utah law, concurrent sentences are favored over consecutive ones. State v. Galli. 
967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998). 
The trial judge abused his discretion by focusing exclusively on the circumstances 
and nature of the offenses rather than considering "'ail legally relevant factors'" State v. 
McCovev. 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) (quoting State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 
1135 (Utah 1989)). Admittedly, the crimes were serious and warranted punishment, but, 
equally compelling factors supported the preference for concurrent sentences. Mr. 
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Perez's criminal background consisted of two misdemeanor DUI offenses, he had no 
violence in his background, and he had not violated probation. 
Although Mr. Perez maintained his innocence and refused to accept responsibility 
for the crimes, he proved his good character. Specifically, he sought to better himself by 
immigrating to the United States. And, while here, he had a history of employment as a 
construction and factory worker. 
Likewise, his stable family background, his work history and his desire to improve 
himself appear to make him a good candidate for rehabilitation. Further, Mr. Perez 
recognized the problems alcohol has caused him and he wants treatment to completely 
abstain from drinking. As evidence of these favorable sentencing factors, both the 
prosecutor and DPP recommended that the trial judge impose concurrent sentences. 
The trial judge failed to even mention these factors supporting concurrent 
sentences and concluded that Mr. Perez was, in fact, guilty and that the crimes were 
"egregious." R. 361: 8. To justify consecutive sentences, the trial judge simply 
rationalized that "in this civilized society [the crimes] cannot and will not be tolerated." 
R. 361: 8. When defense counsel argued that the crimes were interrelated, the trial judge 
disagreed and flippantly added, "if I was to grant him concurrent terms at the prison your 
ultimate appeal wouldn't have near the poignancy." R. 361: 10. 
As this final comment proves, the trial judge failed to take the sentencing 
seriously. Instead, he routinely imposed consecutive sentences. Rather than simply 
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labeling a crime or a defendant "egregious," Utah law requires sentencing judges to 
actually exercise their discretion in sentencing. The trial judge classified Mr. Perez's 
convictions as serious, called them intolerable, and then automatically imposed 
consecutive sentences. Unfortunately, the trial judge seems to approach many of his 
sentencing decisions in a similar manner. Due process bars such "unfairness" and 
requires resentencing. State v. Gomez, 887 P.2d 853, 854-55 (Utah 1994). 
CONCLUSION 
A new trial is required on the attempted murder charge because the jury may have 
convicted Mr. Perez of a nonexistent crime. The State's failure to disclose vital evidence 
prior to trial and the trial judge's disdain for the defense deprived Mr. Perez of a fair trial. 
Moreover, this Court should remand this matter for resentencing. Given the trial judge's 
hostility toward Mr. Perez, this Court should assign this case to a new sentencing judge. 
SUBMITTED this ^ d a y of November, 2000. 
KENT R. HART 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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1. AGGRAVATED BURGLARY - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/19/2000 Guilty Plea 
2 . ATTEMPTED MURDER - 2nd Degree Felony
 as=B=i 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/19/2000 Guilty Plea q s§ 
SENTENCE PRISON O 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED BURGLARY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED MURDER a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
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Case No: 991919507 
Date: May 26, 2000 
State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Prison terms to run consecutive. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
Credit for 236 days time served. 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $750.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: LDA 
Restitution: Amount: $500.00 
Defendant's renewed motion to merge counts is argued and denied. 
The Court's previous ruling will stand. 
Dated t h i s i# day of 
SICK"." fcj4°x::.m %*1 Judge-, \y.i^f :oN 
/ >•>: 
\Vo • 
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ADDENDUM B 
Utah Code Annotated section 77-17-13 (1999) 
(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call 
any expert to testify in a felony case at trial or any hearing, 
excluding a preliminary hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the party intending to call the 
expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon as 
practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days 
before the hearing. 
(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the 
expert, the expert's curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's 
report. 
(2)(a) The expert shall prepare a written report relating to 
the proposed testimony. 
(b) If the expert has not prepared a report or the report 
does not adequately inform concerning the substance of the 
expert's proposed testimony including any opinion and the bases 
and reasons of that opinion, the party intending to call the expert 
shall provide to the opposing party a written explanation of the 
expert's anticipated testimony sufficient to give the opposing 
party adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony, followed 
by a copy of any report prepared by the expert when available. 
(3) (a) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's 
report, the party receiving notice shall provide to the other party 
notice of witnesses whom the party anticipates calling to rebut 
the expert's testimony, including the name and address of any 
expert witness and the expert's curriculum vitae. If available, a 
report of any rebuttal expert shall be provided to the other party. 
(b) If the rebuttal expert has not prepared a report or the 
report does not adequately inform concerning the substance of 
the expert's proposed testimony, or in the event the rebuttal 
witness is not an expert, the party intending to call the rebuttal 
witness shall provide a written explanation of the witness's 
anticipated rebuttal testimony sufficient to give the opposing 
party adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony, followed 
by a copy of any report prepared by any rebuttal expert when 
available. 
(4) (a) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to meet 
the requirements of this section, the opposing party shall be 
entitled to a continuance of the trial or hearing sufficient to 
allow preparation to meet the testimony. 
(b) If the court finds that the failure to comply with this 
section is the result of bad faith on the part of any party or 
attorney, the court shall impose appropriate sanctions. 
(5) (a) For purposes of this section, testimony of an 
expert at a preliminary hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure constitutes notice of the 
expert, the expert's qualifications, and a report of the expert's 
proposed trial testimony as to the subject matter testified to by 
the expert at the preliminary hearing. 
(b) Upon request, the party who called the expert at the 
preliminary hearing shall provide the opposing party with a copy 
of the expert's curriculum vitae as soon as practicable prior to 
trial or any hearing at which the expert may be called as an 
expert witness. 
ADDENDUM C 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose 
to the defense upon request the following material or 
information of which he has knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the 
defendant or codefendants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or 
codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate 
the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or 
mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines 
on good cause shown should be made available to the defendant 
in order for the defendant to adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as 
practicable following the filing of charges and before the 
defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has a continuing 
duty to make disclosure. 
ADDENDUM D 
Utah Code Annotated section 76-5-203(1) (1999) 
Criminal homicide constitutes murder if the actor: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of 
another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another 
commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the 
death of another; 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life, engages in conduct which creates a 
grave risk of death to another and thereby causes the death of 
another. 
ADDENDUM E 
Utah Code Annotated section 76-4-101(1), (2) (1999) 
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an 
attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability 
otherwise required for the commission of the offense, he 
engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward 
commission of the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute 
a substantial step unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's 
intent to commit the offense. 
ADDENDUM F 
+ Y - HJ/-H 
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Transcriber's note: The Engiish grammar mistakes in the translated pAFffofl 3f™UU 
this transcript are an accurate reflexion of the poor Spanish grammar used by the 
interpreter during the interview. DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
Abbreviations: 
Underline = Phrase or word said in English while speaking in Spanish. 
[U/l] = Unintelligible; [l/l] = Unintelligible in Spanish 
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He is trying to rip something off. Was he doing drugs? 
L?or que entro a este casa? Usted va a este casa y despues, 
i,robaba en cosas en este casa? 
Why did you go into this house? You go to this house and 
then, would you steal things in this house? 
I just want to know why. 
El quiere saber por que usted entro ese casa por la ventana. Era 
un... no era un... la mas vieja en este casa. Estaba... Where did 
he cut her? 
He wants to know why you went into this house. It was... it 
wasn't., the oldest lady in this house. He/she was... Where did 
he cut her? 
Ah... got her finger, her shoulder, and puncture... 
Cortar esa chica en la deo, en la hombro y despues no'pagar si es 
persona vieja. Eso es un mal cosa...[l/IJ. So, i,P°r que va a decir 
cuando que piensa? 
To cut that young lady in her finger, her shoulder, and then not 
to pay if it is an old person. That's a bad thing...[U/l]. So, why 
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^Cuando? Pues.^Por drag! 
men? Well, because of drugs? For... 
Por una cosa. Usted puede...^Probaban la cerveza por drogas? 
CPOT que? 
For one thing. You can... Would you try beer for drugs? Why? 
Yo no... no... no... Cuando yo me meti, no habia... no habia nadie. 
No habia gente. Ya... el cuarto ya no habia nadie. En el cuarto ya 
no habia muebles ni ropa. Nada. 
I didn't., didn't., didn't.. When I got in, there wasn't., there 
wasn't anybody. There wasn't anybody. It already... There 
wasn't anybody in the room anymore. There wasn't any 
furniture or clothes. Nothing. 
He said that there was nothing... nothing in the house when he was 
there. 
[VOICES OVERLAP] Was... was this...? Why? Was it because she 
pissed you off because she came out and told you guys to quit 
drinking with the little girls and those type of things? 
Porque ella...esta vieja... [VOICE OVERLAPS WITH 
DETECTIVE'S] 
Because she... this old lady... [VOICE OVERLAPS WITH 
DETECTIVE'S] 
Told you to leave the place? 
...antes... justed se habia enojado con ella porque ella le dijo que 
usted tenia que salir y no dar cerveza a la chica... a las chicas 
menores? 
...before... did you get upset with her because she told you 
that you had to get out and not give beer to the young lady... 
to minor young ladies? 
No. A mi nadie me dijo nada ahi. 
No. Nobody told me anything in there. 
Nuestro sabemos que usted tenia un disgusto con la chica vieja. 
Ok? Porque muchas personas te veo. A lot of people have seen 
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him fighting around, arguing with the old lady. Nuestro sabemos 
que usted tien problem con la chica vieja. Ok. Ella le diso: ella no 
queremos usted por la madrugada tomando cerveza... la cerveza 
con la chica vieja... minores. 
Our know that you would have an argument with the old young 
lady. Ok? Because many people I see you. A lot of people have 
seen him fighting around, arguing with the old lady. Our know 
that you ha a problem with the old young lady. Ok. She telled 
you: she we don't want you in the early morning drinking 
beer... the beer with the old young lady... minors. 
Yo no nunca tomaba afuera. Yo tomaba en el apartamento arriba. 
Yo vivia arriba de...[l/l]. 
I would never drink outside. I would drink inside the apartment 









He says he would drink in the apartment. 
Los que tomaban afuera eran otros muchachos que iban andar ahi 
a dar vuelta por ahi. Vendian droga y venden droga y estan todas 
las noches, todos los dias. 
The ones who would drink outside were other guys that would 
go there to hang around in there. They would sell drugs and 
they sell drugs. They are there every night, every day. 
iQuien vende drogas? 
Who sells drugs? 
Los muchachos que andan ahi. 
The guys who hang around there. 
^Como se llaman los muchachos? 
What are the guys' names? 
No se como se llaman. [VOCES SE ENTRELAZANJ... 
I don't know their names. [VOICES OVERLAP]... 
He says [VOICES OVERLAP]... 
...Yo trabajo. Yo no vendo droga ni nada. 
...I work. I don't sell drugs or anything. 








Este muchacho que vende drogas £vive con el? 
This guy that sells drugs, do you live with him? 
No. Ellos llegan ahi al barrio. 
No. They go there to the neighborh *. 
He says he leaves in the 'barrio'. He
 & jes to the 'barrio*. I guess. 
So. el no vive en el barrio. El va al barrio. 
So, he doesn't live in the neighborhood. He goes to the 
neighborhood. 
Ellos van para alia. 
They go over there. 
Someone goes there. The name is not necessarily right,, but... 






You got my guy? 
Yeah. 
Got it? Do you want to interrupt that? 




Ok. Juan, we know... we know you were in the apartment. You 
admit to that. Ok. I just want to know why... ah... How she got cut. 
Did she get cut with a knife or was it from her being thrown around 
in the room? That is the biggest thing I want to know. With the 
knife? or Did she get kicked... get cut by hitting the wall or hitting 
















No. Entre a una... con una mujer pero cuando entre yo al 
apartamento ya no habia nadie. Cuando yo entre al 
apartamento...[INTERPRETER INTERRUPTS] 
No. I got a... I went in with a woman, but when I went into the 
apartment, there wasn't anybody there anymore. When I went 
into the apartment.. flNTERPRETER INTERRUPTS] 
When he went...[U/l]... 
...ya no habia gente. Ya no habia muebles ni nada. 
...there wasn't anybody anymore. There wasn't any furniture or 
anything. 
He says that nobody was there. 
Ok. Well, we know that somebody was there. 
[Frase l/l]... en el apartamento. 
[U/l phrase]... in the apartment 
I just want to know how she got her finger cut and her arm... and 
her arm cut. Was it with a knife or was it her hitting something, 
hitting her bed or...? 
^Usted tiene un [palabra l/l] or knife? 





Cuando entre al apartamento ni me fije. Nomas me meti asi sin 
nada, pero ya no habia nada. No habia gente. 
When I went into the apartment, I did pay attention. I just went 
in without anything, but there was nothing already. There 
wasn't anybody. 
He is saying that nobody was there. 
The day that that happened, we went there. The police went there 













apartment that same day... that same night. So, there was people 




Ahi no vive nadie. Cuando a mi me agarraron hoy, no vivia nadie. 
No vive nadie ahi en ese apartamento. No hay gente. 
Nobody lives there. When I was arrested today, there was 
nobody living there. Nobody lives there in that apartment 
There isn't anybody. 
He says nobody. 
No me esta diciendo toda la verdad. 
You are not telling me the whole truth. 
Si le estoy diciendo la verdad. Cuando yo me meti en el 
apartamento, no habia gente. No lleve cuchillo ni nada porque yo 
lleve a una muchacha... [INTERPRETE INTERRUPE] 
I am telling you the truth. When I went into the apartment, there 
was nobody. I didn't take a knife or anything with me because I 
took a girl with me... [INTERPRETER INTERRUPTS] 
He is saying that there was no knife, no people. 
...lleve a una muchacha para hacer el amor ahi con ella. Por eso 
me meti al apartamento. 
...I took a girl in with me to make love with her there. That's 
why I went into the apartment. 
^Esa muchacha es tu novia? 
Is that girl your girlfriend? 
No. No la conozco. La agarre en la calle. 
No. I don't know her. I got her on the street. 
He says he doesn't know. He says he got her on the street. 
Your fingerprints are inside the window, Juan. Ah... when reached 














La venta tiene su huella. 
The sale has your fingerprint 
Disculpeme. Cuando lleve a la muchacha me meti por la ventana y 
abri la puerta y ella se metio. 
Excuse me. When I took the giri, I went in through the window 
and I opened the door and she went in. 
^Listed entro inlegal? *the word inlegal does not exist in 
Spanish. The correct word is ilegal. 
Did you go in illegally? 
No. 
No. 
He said they went in the apartment with permission and that... 
Permission from who? 
^De quien? ^Permiso de quien? 
Whose? Whose permission? 
De nadie. Yo me meti asi nomas porque no habia gente y estaba 
abierta la ventana. 
Nobody's. I just went in because there wasn't anybody there 
and the window was open. 
^Como entro un apartamento? Ese no es su apartamento, 
^correcto? Es de otro persona. ,j,C6mo entro? 
How did you go an apartment? That is not your apartment, 
right? It's another person's. How did you go in? 
No. No habia gente. No habia gente, pero me meti porque la 
ventana estaba abierta. 
No. There wasn't anybody. There wasn't anybody, but I went in 
because the window was open. 
He is saying that there wasn't anybody there. He is saying... 
Yo no entiendo senor. 
I don't understand sir. 
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Juan: La ventana estaba abierta. 
The window was open. 
Interpreter: He is saying that the window was open. 
Interpreter Pero usted no tiene permiso para entrar al apartamento, 
icorrecto? 
But you don't have permission to go into the apartment, 
correct? 
Juan: No. No tenia permiso de nadie. 
No. I didn't have anybody's permission. 
Interpreter. Ok. So, he is admitting that... ok... 
Interpreter: Usted tiene [frase l/l] entrar al apartmento. 
You have [U/l phrase] to go into the apartment 
Interpreter: So, he understood that it is against the law to enter the apartment. 
Detective: Which... which window did he enter? Was it the bedroom window? 
Where the kitchen is? or where the living room is at? 
Interpreter-!- Ah... i,Que venta entro usted? 
Ah... What sale did you go in? 
Juan: Por la... por la cocina. 
Through... through the kitchen. 
Interpreter: The kitchen window. 
Detective: How did he leave? 
Interpreter: £Y corno salir el apartamento? 
And how to leave the apartment? 
Juan: Me sali por la puerta con la muchacha despues. 
I later left through the door with the girl. 
Interpreter: Through the door. 









Es una guera. No la conozco. La agarre en la cade. No se quien 
es. 
It's a blonde girl. I don't know her. I got her on the street I 
don't know who she is. 
He" says that he doesn't know the person [Rest of phrase is U/l]. It's 
just a lady. 
Does the door have a... a lock that you have to have a key with 
inside? 
^Listed necesita un Have por la puerta? 
Do you need a key for the door? 
No. Por dentro le quite el seguro y cuando ya sali le puse otra vez 
el seguro y ya sali por la puerta. 
No. I unlocked from the inside. When I then went out, I locked 
it and left through the door. 
What? Yo no entiendo. ^Usted no necesita la Have? 
What? I don't understand. Don't you need a key? 
No. Me met! por la ventana cuando me meti pa' dentro. Y ya 
despues cuando me sali pa' fuera abri la puerta. [PAUSA] Cuando 
me vine para afuera... cuando me sali... 
No. I went in through the window when I went in. And when I 
later left, I opened the door. [PAUSE] When I went outside... 







...abri la puerta. 
...1 opened the door. 
He says that he open* 
Le quite el seguro. 
1 unlocked i t 
^La Have en el lock? 
The key in the lock? 
Juan: No. No tenia Have. Nomas asi. Le quite el seguro. No tenia seguro. 
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No. It didn't have a key. Just without it I unlocked it It didn't 
have a lock. 
Interpreter: He says he didn't have to use a key. He just opened the door and 
left. 
Detective: What time did he... what time did he enter the... the... the 
apartment? What time of the day or night? 
Interpreter: ^Que hora entro al apartamento? 
What time did you go into the apartment? 
Juan: Pues, serian como a las tres o las dos de la tarde. 
Well, it must have been at around three or two in the 
afternoon. 
Interpreter: Ok. Three P.M. 
Interpreter: [U/l Phrase in Spanish] 
Juan: Mas o menos. No estoy seguro. 
More or less. I'm not sure. 
Interpreter: Ok. He is not sure it was at three. 
Detective: Three in the morning. 
Interpreter: iDe la tarde o de la manana? 
In the afternoon or in the morning? 
Juan: De la ma... de la tarde. 
In the mor... in the afternoon. 
Interpreter: Ok. 
Detective: Well, he is obviously changing the story going back and forth. 
Ah... 
Interpreter: He did admit that he entered the apartment. 
Detective: Yeah, he admitted that he... that he went in. That's how his 
fingerprints got in there. But obviously, they didn't know that he 















have a dead bolt or a key that you have to use on the inside to 
leave. So, he had to leave off the window. So... there is no way he 
could have left out the door. 
Usted no puede salir por la puerta, senor. Usted salir apartamento, 
usted necesita sale por la venta. ^Correcto? 
You can't go out the door, sir. You to leave apartment, you 
need leave through sale. Right? 
No. Entre por la ventana y sali por la puerta. 
No. I went in through the window and I left through the door. 
He is saying: He entered through the window and he left through 
the door. 
Did the girl leave with you at the same time? 
i,Esta muchacha estaba ahi con usted? 
Was this girl there with you? 
Si. Ella salio primero y despues sali yo. 
Yes. She went out first and then I did. 
iElla? 
She? 
Ella salio mas primero y despues salt yo. 
She went out first and then I did. 
Ok. iCon usted? 
Ok. With you? 
Si. 
Yes. 
Ok. He is saying that the girl went to the door first and then he 
followed. 
Why is it that when the pblice came right after that happened...? 
Cuando la policia estaba en el apartamento. 













...the people were there that... with us, you coming... going into the 
apartment and coming out of the apartment when they were there, 
why are they saying this about you? 
The gente cerca del apartamento dice usted ir al apartamento a or 
[PAUSA] I get bad with stuff like this. 
The people near the apartment say you to go to the apartment 
to or [PAUSE] I get bad with stuff like this. 
I can understand. 
Ah... La gente dice usted enter el apartamento y usted sale del 
apartamento. 
Ah... The people say you enter the apartment and you go out 
the apartment 
Si entre pero me sali tambien por la puerta. Entre por la ventana y 
me sali por la puerta. 
Yes, I went in, but I also left through the door. I went in through 
the window and I left through the door. 
Ok. He is saying... 
Si me vieron porque era de dia. Yo pienso que si me vio la gente 
porque era de dia. 
I was seen because it was daylight I think that people saw me 
because it was daylight 
lLa gente dice la verdad? 
Do the people say the truth? 
No se. Ella dice la verdad porque me vio que entre yo pero eso de 
dia. A lo mejor me vieron que me meti. 
I don't know. She is saying the truth because she saw me go 
in, but that was during the day. Maybe I was seen when I went 
in. 
Ok. He is saying that he did go in. That he was seen going in. 
So, the people would see that he went in? 
Uh-huh. 
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[U/l PHRASE] [VOICES FROM DETECTIVE AND INTERPRETER 
OVERLAP] 
iTienes los documentos propios para los Estados Unidos, senor? 
Ok ^Usted entro inlegal*? Ok ^Por cuanto tiempo vive usted en los 
Estados Unidos? 
Do you have your own documents for the United States, sir? 
Ok. Did you come illegally? Ok, How long do you live in the 
United States for? 
Como cuatro anos. 
About four years. 
Ok. ^Tiene documentos? Ok. Ah... ^Ha sido arrestado en los 
Estados Unidos antes? 
Ok. Do you have documents? Ok. Have you been arrested in 





Por estar tomando. 
For drinking. 
Ok. Ha sido arrestado de la Migra antes? 
Ok. Have you been arrested of the immigration before? 
No. 
No. 
<j,Tenia problemas con los polocias en su pais? 
Did you have problems with the police in your country? 
No. 
No. 
<j,Nunca has tenido...? 




Interpreter Ok. Ah... I just wanted to know what... He entered four years ago. 










Alright. Just tell him... Ask him what he is more scared of: You guys 
from immigration or to have to deal with the local police. Being 
deported back or having to deal with the charge. 
Usted tiene dos opcion: dar a la corte del estado por este cargo o 
regresar para Mexico. i,Que quiere usted? 
You have two option: to give the State court for this charge or 
to go back to Mexico. What do you want? 
Regresar a Mexico. 
To go back to Mexico. 
Ok. He... He'd much rather be deported. 
<?,Que? <,C6mo? No le entendi. ^Como me dijo? 
What? How? I didn't understand you. What did you tell me? 
Ok. Usted tiene dos opcion: Regresar para Mexico o... porque 
usted no tiene documentos, i,correcto? o estar en la carcel por el 
[Frase l/l] por estos cargos. 
Ok. You have two option: To go back to Mexico or... because 
you don't have documents, right? Or Stay in jail for the [U/l 
PHRASE] for these charges. 
En Mexico, no tengo nada. <j,Que voy a hacer en Mexico? Alia esta 
mi familia y yo le mandaba dinero. Por eso vine aca. 
i don't have anything in Mexico. What am I going to do in 
Mexico? I have my family there and I was sending them money. 
That's why I came here. 
iEste enojado dice la verdad? ^Usted no tiene problemas con ese 
lugar? 
Does this upset one say the truth? Don't you have problems 












No. Yo no tengo problema con nadie alia donde vivo. No se por 
que me estan acusando de eso. 
No. i don't have problems with anyone where I live. I don't 
know why I am being accused of that 
Ok. £l_a gente en la calle no dice la verdad? 
Ok. Don't people on the street say the truth? 
Si. Yo me meti a ese apartamento pero fue de dia cuando me meti, 
y me meti con una muchacha. No se si vieron a la muchacha 
tambien; a la senora. 0 nada mas me vieron a mi. No se. 
Yes. I went into that apartment, but it was during the day when 
I went in. And I went in with a girl. I don't know if the girl was 
also seen, the woman. Or maybe I was the only one seen. I 
don't know. 
That night, he says, he didn't do anything. 
All I want to know, Juan, is that we know you did it. Ok? We... we 
want to make sure that there isn't anybody else that was involved 
that is out there that is doing these same things. That there is 
another person that is going to be burglarized and hurting people. 
Is there anybody else that was involved with it... with you? Are you 
the only one that did it that went into the apartment? Or Is there 
anyone else? 
^Entro al apartamento con otro persona? 
Did you go into the apartment with another person? 
No. Nomas con la muchacha. 
No. Just with the girl. 
[Frase l/l] senor. 
[U/l Phrase] sir. 
i,C6mo? 
What? 
^listed entro al apartamento con otro gente? 
Did you go into the apartment with another people? 
No. Con la muchacha entre. 















i,Y nada mas? 
And that's all? 
Aja. 
Uh-huh. 
Ok. Porque el no quiere mas problemas con la mujer y la otra 
gente en esa... 
Ok. Because he doesn't want to have more problems with the 
woman and the other people in that.. 
Yo tampoco quiero que la muchacha tenga problema porque ella... 
Yo le pague 20 pesos a ella. Veinte (20) dolares le pague. 
I don't want the girl to have problems either because she... I 
paid her 20 'pesos'. I paid her 20 dollars. 
l?or que? 
Why? 
Porque... para que hiciera el amor conmigo. 
Because... so she would make love to me. 
Yo no entiendo. Usted pago 20 dollars por... 
I don't understand. You paid 20 dollars for... 
Por hacer el amor con la muchacha y ella me cobro 20 dolares por 
hacer el amor. Yo se los di y la lleve para alia para el apartamento. 
To make love with the girl; and she charged me 20 dollars to 
make love. I gave them to her and I took there to the 
apartment 
i,Le pago 20 dollars por eso nomas? 
Did you pay her 20 dollars for that only? 
Aja. 
Uh-huh. 
Now, he is saying that he paid 20 dollars for this girl. 
Pardon me. 













^Es su novia o...? 
Is she your girlfriend or...? 
No. No es mi novia. No la conozco. Yo la mire en la calle. Estaba 
sentada en la calle ella y yo le dije que si queria hacer un party. 
Ella me dijo que si. 
No. She is not my girlfriend. I don't know her. I saw on the 
street She was sitting on the street and I asked her if she 
wanted to have a party. She told me yes. 
[LAUGHS] Now, he is saying that now the girl would talk to. 
Y ella me dijo que si. Yo me la lleve para alia... para... para alia... 
para el carro. Yo le dije que nos podiamos quedar en mi carro. Y 
ella me dijo que no que ahi estaba el apartamento que no habia 
gente y que la ventana estaba abierta. Yo me meti a abrirla. 
So, she said yes. I took her to... to... over there... to the car. I 
told her that we could stay in my car. She said no. She said 
that there was an apartment there; that there wasn't anybody 
there and the window was open. I got in to open the window. 
That doesn't seem to be what he was saying [U/l Phrase] ago. 
Esa es la verdad. 
That's the truth. 
No. It wasn't. We have [U/l Phrase] other than what he said about 
her going in there with him. He had told about leaving with her. But, 
being a prostitute was never brought up. [IN A LOUDER VOICE 
DETECTIVE SAYS:] Who cares about the prostitute? That's not 
what I'm asking, Juan. I think you understand a little bit more 
because our officers just arrested you the other night. I think you 
understand me when I'm speaking English to you. Allright? 
[DETECTIVE AND INTERPRETER LAUGH] 
You can tell right there. 
We picked him up for a D.I.U, and that's why he got picked up. 
I think Juan knows he can speak English OK. [U/l Phrase] 











Wasn't it because she pissed you off... she pissed you guys off that 
you went in there? Did you go in there to steal something? Or Did 
you go in there to hurt her? Because if you went in there to steal 
something, I can care less. 
No entiendo m ^ O. Poquito. 
I don't understand a lot A little. 
^Por que entro un apartamento, senor? 
Why did you go in apartment, sir? 
Oh, porque ella queria coger en el carro y ese es un delito estar en 
la calle. 




Si, ella queria en mi carro. Pero si me veia la policia, me iba a 
arrestar por estar haciendo cosas ilegales en la calle. Por eso, 
mejor me metl al apartamento. 
Yes. She wanted it in my car. But if the police would see me, 
they were going to arrest me for doing illegal things on the 
street That is why it was better for me to go into the 
apartment 
Esta mujer quien vive en el apartamento... 
That woman who lives in the apartment.. 
No. Es la otra que estaba en la calle. No la que vivia en el 
apartamento. No la senora que vivia ahi. No la conozco. Yo 
apenas llegue por ahi al apartamento. 
No. It was the other that was on the street It's not the one that 
lived in the apartment It's not the lady that used to live there. I 
don't know her. I just went to the apartment 
El vio que usted tiene un problema con esta mujer en el 
apartamento. 
He saw that you have a problem with this woman in the 
apartment 
Juan: No. Yo no tengo problema con ninguna mujer ahi. 
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No. I don't have a problem with any woman there. 
Interpreter. He is saying that he didn't have a problem with the lady. 
Detective: Does he know who she is? Has he seen her before? 
Interpreter £ listed conozco la mujer que vive el apartamento? 
Do you I know the woman that lives the apartment? 
Juan: No. 
No. 
Interpreter [Frase l/l] 
[U/l Phrase] 
Juan: No. No se ni como se llama. Si la mire una senora que vive ahi con 
otro muchacho- Una senora grande y un muchacho grenudo. No 
la conozco yo. 
No. I don't even know what her name is. I saw a woman that 
used to live there with a young guy-an older lady and a 
tangled-hair guy. 
[U/l INTERPRETER'S AND DETECTIVE'S VOICE OVERLAP] 
Juan: No la conozco yo. 
I don't know her. 
Interpreter: He is saying that he has seen her but he doesn't know her. He 
doesn't know her name. 
Detective: So, he knows who she is or where she lives. She's lived for over 
six months. She hasn't moved out. So the apartment hasn't been 
vacant. Ok? We know that. Do you understand? 
Juan: Poquito. 
A little. 
Detective. Ok. The apartment wasn't vacant. They were living there. Thaf s a 
bull shit story is what you are telling that it was empty. We know 
that. Ok? We know you were inside because your finger prints 
were inside. Is there anything that you took? That's all I want to 
know. Is there anything that you took? Did you take anything out of 
















^Tienes la propiedad de esta mujer? 
Do you have the property of this woman? 
No. 
No. 
Cuando usted sale de su apartamento, £trae otro [PALABRA l/l]? 
When you go out of your/her apartment, did you have [U/l 
word? 
No. Me sali asi con la muchacha. Nothing. No agarre nada. No 
habia nada. 
No. I left with the girl. Nada. I didn't grab anything. There 
wasn't anything. 
^No dinero o...? 
No money or...? 
No. No habia nada. No habia muebles, nada. No habia nada. No 
habia ropa, nada. 
No. There wasn't anything. There was no furniture. Nothing. 
There wasn't anything. There wasn't any clothes. Nothing. 
He says that he didn't touch anything. 
No TV? No...? 
Nada. No habia nada. 




Did you through any of the stuff... any of the... ah... closets or 
anything like while you were there looking for something? 
^Busco por el apartamento? ^Por cosas? 
Did you look around the! apartment? Fdr thins? 
No. No. Yo meti nada mas para hacer el amor con la muchacha. 
No. No. I only went in there to make love with the girl. 
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Interpreter No? 
Juan: No. No habia ropa. No habia nada. 
No. There wasn't any clothes. There wasn't anything. 
Interpreter ^Pero e l apartamento tiene mesas y... ah... y propiedad? 
But the apartment has tables and ... ah... and property? 
Juan: No. No tenia nada cuando yo me meti. No habia gente. No vivia 
nadie. 
No. It didn't have anything when I got in there. There weren't 
people. Nobody lived there. 
Interpreter He says that there was nothing there. I asked him if there was a 
table or anything. He said nothing. 
Detective: Well, I think that... I mean he was going there to try to have sex. 
There was some money that was taking. Did you take it? 
Juan: Yo nunca... 
I never... 
Interpreter: <,Usted saca el dinero? 




Juan: Seguro que no agarre el dinero. 
I assure you I didn't take the money. 
Interpreter No. La verdad, senor. 
No. The truth, sir. 
Juan: La verdad. 
The truth. 
'! 'I 
Interpreter •' ^Cuanto dinero tiene usted? 
How much money do you have? 
Juan: Ahorita mi... <j,En donde? 
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Cuando usted sale del apartamento. ^Cuanto dinero tenia usted? 
Cuando usted... 
When you go out the apartment How much money did you 
have? When you... 
There was somebody in her... in her bedroom. Did you take the 
money that was out of her bedroom? I... I don't care about what 
happened to her. Ok? I want to find out about the money. Did you 
take any money that was in her apartment when you were there? 
iQue paso con el dinero? 
What happened with the money? 
iQue dinero? Yo... yo... yo trabajo. El dinero que yo gano yo... 
What money? I... I... I work. The money that I make, I... 
[U/l] 
That's what she said. She said that she had money in her apart... 
in her bedroom when this person... when you... when you came in. 
She says that there was money in there. Is she lying? Or Is she 
telling the truth? Was there money or not? 
Cuando usted entro a su apartamento, la mujer dice usted tiene 
ah... ella tiene dinero. ^Usted saca este dinero? Or <,Esa mujer no 
dice la verdad? 
When you went into her apartment, the woman says you have 
ah... she has money. Do you take this money? Or Is she not 
telling the truth? 
Yo no... Cuando yo entre al apartamento, no habia gente. 
I don't.. When I went into the apartment, there wasn't anybody. 
He saying: No one was there. 
Cuando yo me meti no habia nada. No habia... 
When I went in there was nothing in there. There wasn't... 
iY no bolsas, no... no... no dinero... no nada? 











Nada. No habia gente. No habia gente. Yo me meti nomas con la 
muchacha. Yo! Yo nomas solito con la muchacha. 
Nothing. There wasn't anybody. There wasn't anybody. I only 
went in with the girl. I! I, by myself, went in with the girl. 
He says he just went with the lady. No one else was there. 
No habia gente. No habia gente en esa casa... en ese 
apartamento ese donde dice. 
There wasn't anybody. There wasn't anybody in that house... 
in that apartment you're saying. 
Senor, la version que dice usted entro a este apartamento y... una 
mujer tenia apartamento. Y esta mujer tiene problemas con usted. 
Yo no entiendo. 
Sir, your story is that you went into that apartment and... a 
woman had apartment And this woman has problems with 
you. I don't understand. 
Yo la mujer que lleve, la agarre en la calle. No... no... no... En la 
calle iba yo en mi carro y la mire. Ella estaba sentada y yo le 
hable. Le dije si queria hacer party. Ella me dijo que si. 
The woman that I took, I got on the street No... no... no... I was 
in my car on the street and I saw her. She was seating and I 
spoke to her. I asked her if she wanted to party. She said yes. 
[U/l] 
Esa es la verdad. Es la verdad lo que le estoy diciendo. No estoy 
diciendo mentiras. 
That's the truth. What I'm saying is the truth. I'm not saying 
lies. 
What do you think is going to happen to you, Juan, when you go to 
trial? When you get prosecuted for this? 
I don't see the need to ask him that. I don't think he is going to 
come clean with anything. 
What if you do go to trial? And you go to prison. If you tell them the 
truth, do you know what is going to happen to you? Salt Lake City, 
Utah. You tell them the truth and the judge... well, I don't want to 















you tell the truth [U/l word]. Ok. If you tell the truth of what 
happened, more likely all is going to happen is maybe you just be 
deported. Maybe. 
No guarantees. 
No guarantees, but if you seat there and lie to everything and don't 
come clean with us, then what do you think they are going to do? 
They got your finger prints on the inside of that apartment. They 
know you were there. 
Yo no robe nada. No robe nada yo. 
I didn't steal anything. I didn't steal anything. 
He says he didn't rob anybody. 
Was there any other people inside the apartment when you went in 
other than the lady? 
^Tiene...? Cuando usted entro departamento, justed entro con 
otra persona o usted y esa mujer solamente? 
Do you have...? When you went into apartment, did you go in 
with another person or you and that woman only? 
Nomas yo y la muchacha. La senora. 
Only the girl and myself. The lady. 
Ok. And the girl. 
<,EI apartamento tiene otra persona? 
Does the apartment have another person? 
No. No habia. 
No. There wasn't 
No. <[,No persona? 
No. No person? 
No. Dos personas. Yo y la muchacha. 
No. Two people. The girl and myself. 
Ok. 
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Ha visto la novia... Oh, perdon... la nino de tu mujer? 
Have you seen the girlfriend... Oh! sorry... the boy of your 
woman? 
No. No se si tiene ninos. 
No. I don't know if she has small children. 
[U/l] 
No. He is not a kid anymore. He is forty years old. 
Oh. 
It's your last chance, Juan. I'm going to walk out of the door. I'm 
going to go tell the... You know... finish my paperwork and basically 
say that... that you lied about everything and wouldn't come clean 
with anything and you are not going to stand up to your mess. 
La ultima persona dice la verdad, senor. 
The last person tells the truth, sir. 
Ya le dije la verdad. Nomas lleve a la muchacha. Nomas yo. Yo y 
la muchacha y no habia nada. No habia muebles. Nada. Esa es la 
verdad. 
I already told the truth. I only took the girl. Myself only. The girl 
and myself, and there wasn't anything. There wasn't furniture. 
Nothing. That's the truth. 
You know... If you... If you come clean with us, maybe you can 
work something with the District Attorney and a plea for the charge. 
Si usted dice la verdad, usted... depende lo... usted no va a [Frase 
l/l]...nuevamente en Mexico... no violar nunca la ley o la plicia. 
Claro que si usted no dice la verdad... 
If you tell the truth, you... it depends on... you are not going 
to... [U/l Phrase]... in Mexico again... never violate the law or 
'plicia'. [INTERPRETER INTERPRETED THE ENGLISH WORD 
"PLEA" AS 'PLICIA'. 'PLICIA' DOES NOT EXIST IN SPANISH] 
Estoy diciendo la verdad. [EMPHATIC STATEMENT] 









I'm telling the truth. 
Esa es la verdad. Ya mi se quiere deportar, pues me deporta. No 
hay problema. 
That's the truth. If you want to deport me, then depoirt me. No 
problem. 
What did he say? 
That that's the truth. 
Ok. [RECORDING WAS STOPPED AND STARTED AGAIN] 
[Frase l/l]... se salio ella y yo tambien me sail. Esa es la verdad. Yo 
acepto que me meti, pero yo no agarre nada. Ya estaba limpio el 
apartamento. Ya no habia muebles. No habia nada. No habia 
cama. Nada. Esa es la verdad. 
[U/l Phrase]... she went out and I also went out. That's the 
truth. I accept responsibility for going in, but I didn't take 
anything. The apartment was already clean. There wasn't any 
furniture anymore. There wasn't anything. There wasn't a bed. 
Nothing! That's the truth. 
Ok. 
[END OF RECORDING] 
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ADDENDUM G 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ < 
Under the law of the State of Utah, Attempted Criminal 
Homicide constitutes Attempted Murder if the actoil: 
(a) attempted to intentionally or knowingly cause the 
death of another; 
or, 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another 
commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that attemptes to 
cause the death of another; 
or, 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life engages in conduct which creates a 
grave risk of death to another and thereby attempts to cause the 
death of another. 
00304 
INSTRUCTION NO. Hlg 
Before you can convict the defendant, JUAN Q. PEREZ, 
of the offense of Attempted Criminal Homocide, Murder, as 
charged in count II of the information, you must find from all 
of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one 
of the following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 9th day of August, 1999, in Salt: 
Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, JUAN Q.PEREZ, 
attempted to cause the death of ELLEN KUHEL; and 
2. That said defendant then and there did so: (a) 
intentionally or knowingly; or (b) intending to cause serious 
bodily injury to another, he committed an act clearly dangercus 
to human life, which act attempted to cause the death of ELLEN 
KUHEL; or (c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life, he knowingly engaged in conduct 
which created a grave risk of death to another and which conduct 
attempted to cause the death of ELLEN KUHEL; and 
3. That said defendant then and there did so unlawfully. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of Attempted Criminal 
Homocide,Murder as charged in count II of the information. If, 
on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements, then you 
must find the defendant not guilty of count II. 
00305 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3LH 
As used in these instructions, "grave risk of death" refers 
to probability of the risk of death greater than just a 
"substantial and unjustifiable" risk. A "grave risk of death" 
means a highly likely probability that death will result from 
the risk that the defendant knowingly creates. 
The term "knowingly" as used in the definition of depraved 
indifference murder means that the actor knew the nature of his 
conduct, knew the circumstances that gave rise to the risk of 
death, and knew that the risk constituted a grave risk of death, 
but he need not have had as his conscious objective or desire to 
cause the result; nor, need he be aware that his conduct is 
reasonably certain to cause the results i.e., death. 
The term "depraved indifference to human life" refers not 
to the subjective culpable mental state of depraved indifference 
murder, but rather to an objective reasonable person standard as 
to the value of human life. "Depraved indifference" means an 
utter callousness toward the value of human life and a complete 
and total indifference as to whether one's conduct will create a 
grave risk of death to another. Thus, a finding of depraved 
indifference must be based on an objective evaluation of the 
magnitude of the risk created and of all the circumstances 
surrounding the death. That evaluation should focus on the 
gravity of the risk to human life that is created and the 
callousness of attitude toward that risk. In evaluating the 
evidence, the jury should consider the following factors: (1) 
the utility of the defendant's conduct which attempted to cause 
0030? 
the death; (2) the magnitude of the risk created by the 
defendant's conduct; (3) the defendant's knowledge of the risk; 
and (4) any precaution taken by the defendant to minimize that 
risk. 
00307 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 ^ (<Q 
I have previously used the term, "depraved indifference" in 
these instructions. The term is not specifically defined by 
statute. Thus, the phrase, "depraved indifference" is a concept 
which must be left largely to the experience and common sense of 
the jury. 
To engage in conduct with a "depraved indifference to human 
life, " a person must do more than act "recklessly, " but he need 
not have as his conscious objective or desire to cause the 
result; nor need he be aware that his conduct is reasonably 
certain to cause the result. 
Rather, the greatness of the risk which the defendant's 
actions create and the lack of justification for the creation of 
the risk is the test to be applied in determining whether the 
defendant's conduct evidences a "depraved indifference to human 
life." 
The circumstances under which the defendant acted must be 
viewed objectively by a reasonable man rather than subjectively 
by the actual state of the defendant's mind in order to 
determine whether the circumstances under which the defendant 
acted were such as to evidence a depraved indifference to human 
life. 
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